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Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric
Information: Exclusive v. Optional Remedies
Ronen Avraham and Zhiyong Liu

Abstract

Law and economics scholars have always had a strong interest in contract remedies. Perhaps the most explored issue in contract law has been the desirability
of various contract remedies, such as expectation damages, specific performance,
or liquidated damages, to name the most common. Scholars have been debating
for years, from various perspectives, the comparative advantage of these remedies.
Yet, most scholars have assumed that each of these remedies is exclusive, and their
work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract.
Interestingly, an analysis that assumes these remedies are optional (or cumulative)
has not yet been explored, in spite of the fact that contract law provides the nonbreaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a
breach, and in spite of the fact that parties themselves write contracts which provide such an option. In this paper we attempt to start filling in this gap by studying
the relationship between these remedies. Specifically, we study the conditions at
which a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose from
optional remedies is superior to an exclusive remedy contract. We show that under conditions of double-sided uncertainty and asymmetric information between a
seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never breaches) the interaction of the
parties’ distributions should determine whether a contract provides for exclusive
or optional remedies. Specifically, if the buyer’s conditional expected valuation is
larger than the seller’s conditional expected valuation (in both cases - conditional
that their expected valuation is above the buyer’s mean valuation), then a contract which provides the buyer an option to choose between liquidated damages or
specific performance (or actual damages) is superior. Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of the relevant economic factors they should consider
when deciding the optimal composition of remedies in a given context. Moreover,
our analysis is relevant for courts that interpret contracts because it will help them

to better understand whether rational parties would have agreed that a particular
remedy would be an exclusive remedy or an optional remedy when the language
of the contract is ambiguous. Lastly, our analysis provides yet another economic
rationale for why courts should enforce parties’ liquidated damages clauses even
if it seems ex-post over, or under, compensatory. We present a model which shows
when parties will agree on a non-exclusive liquidated damages clause. Under such
a contract the parties stipulate ex-ante that the buyer will have the option to choose
upon breach whether she prefers an optional remedy, such as actual damages or
specific performance, to the pre-determined liquidated damages. We focus on the
ex-ante design of the contract in light of the new information that the parties anticipate they will gain after they draft the contract. Therefore, we assume that no
renegotiation or investments are involved. We demonstrate the optimal way to
design contract clauses which takes advantage of the information that the seller
and the buyer receive between the time they enter into the contract and the time of
the actual breach. We further suggest that parties indeed use such clauses and that
courts honor them. After laying out the basic model we provide some extensions
to it. As is well known, an exclusive liquidated damages contract is equivalent
to granting the seller a call option to breach and pay, where the exercise price
is equal to the amount of the agreed liquidated damages. What is perhaps less
known is that a non-exclusive, or optional, contract, where the buyer can choose
performance, is equivalent to giving the buyer a consecutive call option with the
same exercise price. Yet, the consecutive call option to the buyer does not have to
have the same exercise price but can rather have a higher one. We call this new
contract a two-price contract and show that it is even more efficient than the basic
contract we have explored before. Next, we introduce more rounds of sequential
options and show that while the regular ex-ante contract can achieve on average about 4 Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation
costs are high. More on this below. 90% of the first-best allocative efficiency, an
n-rounds contract approaches the first best, as n goes to infinity. We show numerically that within just 4 rounds, 96% of the allocative efficiency can be achieved.
Section two describes the legal background against which we have designed our
model. Section three surveys the literature that evaluates contract remedies from
an economic perspective. Section four presents a simple model with two-sided
incomplete information and with a liquidated damages clause. In section four we
compare the performance of a regime with optional remedies with a regime of
exclusive remedy and then determine the conditions at which each regime should
be applied. Section five discusses some interesting extensions meant to approach
the first-best allocative efficiency. The appendix provides a more rigorous mathe-

matical demonstration of the model.
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1. Introduction
Law and economics scholars have always had a strong interest in contract
remedies. Perhaps the most explored issue in contract law has been the desirability of
various contract remedies, such as expectation damages, specific performance, or
liquidated damages, to name the most common. Scholars have been debating for years,
from various perspectives, the comparative advantage of these remedies.1 Yet, most
scholars have assumed that each of these remedies is exclusive, and their work has
compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. Interestingly, an
analysis that assumes these remedies are optional (or cumulative) has not yet been
explored, in spite of the fact that contract law provides the non-breaching party with a
variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach,2 and in spite of the fact
that parties themselves write contracts which provide such an option.3
In this paper we attempt to start filling in this gap by studying the relationship
between these remedies. Specifically, we study the conditions at which a contract that
grants the non-breaching party an option to choose from optional remedies is superior to
an exclusive remedy contract. We show that under conditions of double-sided uncertainty
and asymmetric information between a seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never
breaches) the interaction of the parties’ distributions should determine whether a contract
provides for exclusive or optional remedies. Specifically, if the buyer's conditional
expected valuation is larger than the seller’s conditional expected valuation (in both
cases- conditional that their expected valuation is above the buyer’s mean valuation),
then a contract which provides the buyer an option to choose between liquidated damages
or specific performance (or actual damages) is superior.

1

See for example, Tom Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of
Contract Remedies, 83 MICH L. REV. 341; Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM L. REV. 554.
2
Chapter 7, Article 2 of the UCC provides a list of optional remedies, but parties can agree on any other
remedy, provided they conform with some basic principles of contract law. See generally Article 1-102(3)
to the UCC; and more particularly see Article 2-719(1). The entire of chapter 66 in Corbin is dedicated to
“election of remedies”.
3
It is suffice to recall the following prevalent contract clause: “Upon breach, the seller can choose, at his
discretion….”.
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Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of the relevant economic
factors they should consider when deciding the optimal composition of remedies in a
given context. Moreover, our analysis is relevant for courts that interpret contracts
because it will help them to better understand whether rational parties would have agreed
that a particular remedy would be an exclusive remedy or an optional remedy when the
language of the contract is ambiguous. Lastly, our analysis provides yet another
economic rationale for why courts should enforce parties’ liquidated damages clauses
even if it seems ex-post over, or under, compensatory.
We present a model which shows when parties will agree on a non-exclusive
liquidated damages clause. Under such a contract the parties stipulate ex-ante that the
buyer will have the option to choose upon breach whether she prefers an optional
remedy, such as actual damages or specific performance, to the pre-determined liquidated
damages.
We focus on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of the new information that
the parties anticipate they will gain after they draft the contract. Therefore, we assume
that no renegotiation or investments are involved.4 We demonstrate the optimal way to
design contract clauses which takes advantage of the information that the seller and the
buyer receive between the time they enter into the contract and the time of the actual
breach. We further suggest that parties indeed use such clauses and that courts honor
them.
After laying out the basic model we provide some extensions to it. As is well
known, an exclusive liquidated damages contract is equivalent to granting the seller a call
option to breach and pay, where the exercise price is equal to the amount of the agreed
liquidated damages. What is perhaps less known is that a non-exclusive, or optional,
contract, where the buyer can choose performance, is equivalent to giving the buyer a
consecutive call option with the same exercise price. Yet, the consecutive call option to
the buyer does not have to have the same exercise price but can rather have a higher one.
We call this new contract a two-price contract and show that it is even more efficient than
the basic contract we have explored before. Next, we introduce more rounds of sequential
options and show that while the regular ex-ante contract can achieve on average about
4

Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation costs are high. More on this below.
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90% of the first-best allocative efficiency, an n-rounds contract approaches the first best,
as n goes to infinity. We show numerically that within just 4 rounds, 96% of the
allocative efficiency can be achieved.
Section two describes the legal background against which we have designed our
model. Section three surveys the literature that evaluates contract remedies from an
economic perspective. Section four presents a simple model with two-sided incomplete
information and with a liquidated damages clause. In section four we compare the
performance of a regime with optional remedies with a regime of exclusive remedy and
then determine the conditions at which each regime should be applied. Section five
discusses some interesting extensions meant to approach the first-best allocative
efficiency. The appendix provides a more rigorous mathematical demonstration of the
model.
2. The Law of Exclusive Remedies.
While the typical default remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages,
other remedies may also be available. For example, where the goods are unique and
damages are otherwise inadequate, the default remedy may be specific performance if
enforcement does not impose too large of a burden on the court, and other conditions are
met.5
Parties can enhance or restrict the set of available remedies in case of a breach.
They can agree, for example, on liquidated damages; (see section 356 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and Article 2-718 to the UCC.) If the liquidated clause meets some
necessary conditions, like not being a penalty or otherwise unconscionable, then courts
may well enforce such clauses.
Parties can then further agree that the liquidated damages clause will or will not
be the exclusive remedy. They can agree for example that the non-breaching party will be
allowed, upon breach, to elect between receiving the pre-determined liquidated damages,

5

See article 2-716 to the UCC and Restatement (Second) of Contracts articles 359 and 366.
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or seeking specific performance. Courts will indeed honor such clauses.6 In a similar
manner, parties can agree to allow the non-breaching party to elect between the liquidated
damages clause and recovering the ex-post actual damages. Historically, courts did not
honor such clauses and determined that such an option in itself renders the liquidated
damages clause an unenforceable penalty.7 Yet, recently it seems that court may be more
likely than ever before to honor such clauses.8 Alternatively, parties can agree that the
liquidated damages be the exclusive remedy, and courts will honor it. For example, in a
recent 2002 case the Appellate Court of Illinois refused to grant the purchaser of a
townhouse specific performance (which is considered traditionally the default remedy for
breach of land contracts) only because the contract explicitly provided that the
purchaser’s liquidated damages are his “sole remedy”.9
A study of various standard industry contracts reveal that both types of contracts –
where parties contract for exclusive or for optional liquidated damages — widely exist.
For example, most standard real estate contracts state explicitly that in the event of
breach, the seller’s sole remedy is liquidated damages in the form of earnest money.10 In
production contracts under which goods are specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not readily resalable on the market, the buyer’s exclusive remedy is liquidated damages.11
The same holds in some service contracts wherein the amount of damages in the event of
6

See for example Underwood v. Sterner, 387 P.2d 366 (S.C Wash, 1963). For a more recent case see
Sweatt v. Intenrational Development Corp., 531 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. COA, 2000).
7
For example, in Dalston Const. Corp. v. Wallace 214 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y.Dist.Ct., 1960) the plaintiff was
explicitly allowed in the contract to seek actual damages if they came out to be higher than his liquidated
damages. Refusing actual damages the court said “[t]he [liquidated] clause here does not disclose a fixed
amount. In essence it fixes a minimum which must be paid by the [defendant] to the [plaintiff], but leaves the
door wide open to [the plaintiff] to prove actual damage in addition to the so-called liquidated damage. This is no
settlement at all and it permits the [plaintiff] to have his cake and eat it too.” A more recent case which applies

a similar approach is Jefferson Randolph Corp. v. Progressive Data Systems, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. App
, 2001). And see Farnsworth, On Contracts, (3rd ed, 2004) 320, and cases cited in his footnote 6.
8
For example in Leahy Realty Corp. v. American Snack Foods Corp., 625 N.E. 2d 956 (Ill. App. 1993) the
court allowed the non-breaching party to recover actual damages despite the existence of a liquidated
damages clause after it found that the contract explicitly aloud that. And see Noble v. Ogborn, 717 P.2d
285 (Wash. App, 1986) (same) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Trails, 3 F.3d 292, 294-95 (8th Cir.
1993) (same). And see Farnsworth id for more cases.
9
O’shield v. Lakeside Bank, 781 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill.App , 2002).
10 See, e.g., Mississippi Real Estate Contracts and Closings, Contracts for the Purchase of Real Estate §
6:18. 10 Ariz. Legal Forms, Bus. Org. LLC & Part. § 27.4 (2d ed.). But sometimes they leave it open: 15C
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d Real Estate Sales § 219:596
11 See, e.g., West Pennsylvania Forms, Buyer’s Right on Improper Delivery § 2601. 4A Vernon's Okla.
Forms 2d, Com. & Consumer Forms § 2-601--Form 2, 5 Ariz. Legal Forms, Comm. Transactions § 2.392
(2d ed.)
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breach is not readily ascertainable.12 Contracts for the sale of burglar or fire alarm
systems are similar in that manner.13 On the other hand, in a standard contract of schools’
invitation to bid for software, the liquidated damages are explicitly non-exclusive14, so is
the liquidated damages clause in a standard “Tree Estimate Timber Sale Contract”15.
Other types of standard contract where liquidated damages are not exclusive are contract
for purchase business16, and agreements to transfer materials and intellectual property.17
Yet, exactly when parties would contract for exclusive liquidated damages clauses
and when for optional ones is not clear. Below we present a model which attempts to
shed some light on this question.
Much more litigation arises though in a liquidated damages contracts which do
not explicitly mention whether the liquidated damages are exclusive or optional, (we call
it here a “silent” contract). Can the non-breaching party still seek specific performance or
actual damages?18 In “silent” contracts the general default rule has two parts.19 First, the
non-breaching party is not entitled upon breach to seek higher actual damages.20 Second,
12 For example, one form contract recommends the following language: “It is agreed by and between the
parties that the Contractor is not an insurer, that the payments hereinbefore named are based solely on the
value of the service in the maintenance of the system described, that it is impracticable and extremely
difficult to fix the actual damages, if any, which may proximately result from a failure on the part of the
contractor to perform such service and in case of failure to perform such service and a resulting loss its
liability hereunder shall be limited to and fixed at the sum of fifty dollars as liquidated damages, and not as
a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive.” 27 West's Legal Forms, Specialized Forms § 3.9 (3d ed.).
13 27 West's Legal Forms, Specialized Forms § 3.9 (3d ed.), 6 N.J. Forms Legal & Bus § 11A:14, 6A
Texas Forms Legal & Bus. § 11C:68,
14 30 West's Legal Forms, Specialized Forms § 31.46 (3d ed.), 15A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d Public
Works and Contracts § 216:25
15 5E Nichols Cyc. Legal Forms s 5.6682
16 8 Nichols Cyc. Legal Forms s 8.1331
17 Forms Legal & Bus. s 42:26
18
We ignore the symmetric question of whether the breaching party can ask ex-post to pay lower actual
damages instead of the higher liquidated damages. The do that, the breaching party may try one of three
strategies. First, he may ask the court to strike down the liquidated damages clause for being a “penalty”.
This has occasionally proved to be a successful strategy. Second, he may ask the court to strike down the
liquidated damages clause because the actual damages are capable of accurate estimation. Third, he may
argue that the liquidated damages are not the exclusive remedy and that the breaching party should be
allowed to pay the actual damages. This has usually proved to be an unsuccessful strategy.
19
Corbin (2nd ed, 1964) sections 1061, 1070 and 1213.
20
The leading UCC case is Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1975)
(plaintiff could not recover his actual damages but was rather restricted to the lower amount of the
liquidated damages, despite the fact the liquidated damages clause was not expressly exclusive.) For a more
recent case see for example Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc. v. DelGuidice, 790 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.
COA, 2001). Interestingly, courts did find their ways to let the non-breaching party receive sometimes
higher actual damages instead of the lower stipulated damages. They have done it in three ways. First, they
have done it by determining that the breach which occurred is different than the breach that liquidated
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and conversely, the non-breaching party is still entitled to seek specific performance,
assuming the conditions for granting specific performance hold, (Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §357 (1979) and article 2-716 of the UCC).21 For example, in a recent case
between “sophisticated parties” a court ruled that a “silent” liquidated damages clause did
not preclude the utility company (the buyer of a coal delivery services) from seeking
specific performance from the railroad company, but did preclude utility’s election of
actual cost of obtaining alternate fuel.22
damages covered (Murphy v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 100 A.D. 93, 94, 91 N.Y.S. 582, 583
(1905)). Second, they have done it by determining that the circumstances cause an exclusive liquidated
damages clause to “fail of its essential purpose” (under article 2-719(2) to the UCC). See Latimer v.
William Mueller & son, Inc. 386 N.W. 2d 618 (Mich 1986). (Liquidated damages clause in a defected
seeds contract fail its essential purpose and therefore plaintiff is entitled to receive actual damages). And
see Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (same). Third, they have done it by determining that the
small liquidated damages clause is unconscionable. See for example Bonhard v. Gindin, 142 A. 52,(
N.J.Err. & App. 1928)(“In the present action to limit the damages to the amount expressed in the agreement
as liquidated damages would be unconscionable.”)
21 The Restatement (Second) of Contract §361 (1979) reads “Specific performance or an injunction may
be granted to enforce a duty even though there is a provision for liquidated damages for breach of that
duty.” This might strike the attentive reader as weird because one of the pre-conditions for granting
specific performance is that damages are inadequate. But if parties agreed on liquidated damages ex-ante,
how can they be inadequate ex-post? Yet, courts have ruled that the mere existence of liquidated damages
does not render damages adequate, and specific performance can still be granted. See for example
Carolina Cotton Growers Association v. Arnette (D.C.S.C.1974), 371 F.Supp. 65 and Washington
Cranberry Growers’ Ass’n v. Moore, 117 Wash. 430 (1921), where the court essentially granted specific
performance against a cranberry farmer despite a liquidated damages clause. And See Corbin (2nd ed,
1964) section 1213 and Farnsworth On Contract, Vol 3, (3rd ed, 2004) at 173.
22
The language of the liquidated damages clause provided that the railroad company “shall” pay to the
utility liquidated damages in case of a breach. The court, citing another case, said that “A ‘shall’ provision
for liquidated damages gives the party who does not breach the contract only one option: he can sue for
specific performance, but he cannot sue for actual damages; the stipulated figure is the only option he has
for damages.” Entergy Services, Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Neb. 1999) 35 F. Supp. 2d 746, 754
and cases cited there. And see Carolina Cotton Growers Association v. Arnette where the defendant failed
to deliver cotton as promised in the contract. The court allowed the plaintiff to specifically enforce the
promise to deliver the cotton which the defendant had grown for him, despite the presence of a liquidated
damages clause.371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974). And see similarly Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward.
132 A. 12 (SC. N.H 1926) where the court ordered Hayward to deliver milk to the plaintiff (a cooperative)
despite the existence of liquidated damages clause. A common problem with specific performance is the
burden it imposes on the court in monitoring the performance. Yet, the latter problem is not as difficult as it
may first seem because courts have indirectly enforced performance by granting a negative decree instead
of a positive one, i.e. an injunction not to do something rather than monitoring a specific performance. For
example, courts have historically enforced covenants not to compete by granting an injunction which
prevents a former employee or a partner from working in the same area as her former employer. See Wirth
& Hamid Fair Booking v. Wirth, 192 N.E. 297 (N.Y C.O.A, 1934). For more modern cases see for
example, Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons v. Peairs, 790. P.2d 752 (Ariz. 1989), Brian McDonagh S.C v.
Moss, 565 N.E. 2d 159 (Ill. 1990), Bradley v. Health Coalition, Inc. 687 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1999). Similarly,
courts have granted injunctions preventing farmers from selling their harvest to anyone else but the
plaintiff, indirectly enforcing the original contract. See for example, Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward.
132 A. 12 (SC. N.H 1926) ("While it is practically impossible to compel specific performance of a contract
of this nature, there is abundant authority that the court may, by enjoining the contractor from selling his
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Exactly why courts allow the non-breaching party in a “silent” contract to seek
specific performance but not damages is however not clear.23
Other times, courts interpret a “silent” liquidated damages clause as an exclusive
remedy. Courts have done this by interpreting the contract as an “option contract” or
“alternate performance contract” that allows the breaching party to pay liquidated
damages and nullify the contract, thus preventing the non-breaching party from seeking
specific performance.24 What exactly distinguishes these contracts from a “silent”
contract with liquidated damages which is found to be non-exclusive is unclear.25
To sum up, the legal analysis has revealed that first, parties explicitly contract for
both exclusive and optional liquidated damages clauses, yet it is not clear when they
would prefer each type of clause. Second, that courts not always allow the non-breaching
party to recover actual damages, even if the option was explicitly contracted for. Third,
when the liquidated damages clause is silent, courts nevertheless usually allow the nonbreaching party to seek specific performance, yet sometimes they do not, without any
apparent reason for what account for the difference in their interpretation of the contract.
Fourth, courts never allow the non-breaching party to seek actual damages in such
circumstances.
wares to any one else, place him in a position where his own interest may be powerful enough to induce
him to perform his contract.") and the cases cited in that case. And see Corbin (2nd ed, 1964) section 1206.
23
Compare for example, Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, where the defendant breached the
contract and failed to deliver wheat and durum to the plaintiff and the court held that the plaintiff could not
recover his actual damages but is rather restricted to the lower amount of the liquidated damages, despite
the fact the liquidated damages clause was not expressly made exclusive. 238 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1975) with
Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward. 132 A. 12 (N.H.S.C 1926) where the court ordered Hayward to
deliver milk to the plaintiff (a cooperative) despite the existence of liquidated damages clause.
24
Courts have done this even where the contract was not phrased as an option contract, and even if the
asset was land. See for example, Davis v. Isenstein. 100 N.E. 940 (SC of Illinois, 1913); Bank v. Lester,
404 So. 2d 141 (Fla. App. 1981). See Farnsworth id at p 181.
25
“To distinguish between liquidated damages and alternate performances requires angels to dance upon
the heads of pins.” Debora Threedy, Liquidated and Limited Damages and The Revision of Article 2: An
Opportunity to Rethink The U.C.C’s treatment of Agreed Remedies, 27 Idaho L. Rev. 427,441. And
consider: “Because of its ambiguity, the alternative performances device has been a method frequently used
by courts to enforce clauses that they believed they could not enforce as liquidation of damages
provisions.” Justin Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 Calif. Law Rev. 84, 94. And see Corbin id
section 1213. "The fact that the contract provides that, in case of breach, the damage shall be as there
admitted, does not of itself conclusively establish that the parties contemplated that, upon the breach
thereof, damages would be an adequate remedy. It is a question of intention in each case, to be deduced
from the whole instrument and the circumstances, and, if it appears that the performance of the covenant
was intended, and not merely the payment of damages in case of breach, the contract will be enforced”,
Washington Cranberry Growers' Association v. Moore (1921) 201 P. 773, at
777.
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These discrepancies demonstrate the need for a model that shows exactly when
parties would contract for an exclusive liquidated damages and when, in contrast, they
would allow the non-breaching party to seek specific performance or damages. Such a
model will be useful courts when they interpret “silent” contracts as well as for lawyers
to avoid “silent” contracts and be explicit about whether or not the liquidated damages
clause is exclusive. The following sections present this model.
3. Related Literature
In this section we survey previous related work and distinguish our work. Current
literature indicates that complex contracts that apply a mechanism design approach can
achieve first best when parties write the contracts at the ex-ante stage. Moreover, simple
contracts may achieve first best as well, but only if parties’ valuations are observable and
costless renegotiation is possible. In contrast, we explore a simple contract where the
parties’ valuations are assumed to be unobservable, which means that renegotiation at
this stage is costly; indeed we assume that it is prohibitively costly.26 We nevertheless are
able approach first best. We now describe the literature in more detail.
Most of the literature applies a “mechanism design” approach to optimal
contracting, and articles written within this approach attempt to find ways to provide
parties with incentives to truthfully reveal their valuation. Myerson & Satterthwaite

26

A quick note on the renegotiation assumption is nevertheless necessary here. First, most papers that used
non-contingent contracts needed the assumption of costless renegotiation to achieve first-best. Yet, a
renegotiation game is never costless ex-post and hard to design ex-ante. It is thus questionable whether
writing a non-contingent contract and designing a renegotiation game (which itself should be renegotiation
proof) is indeed simpler than writing a contingent contract (Schmitz (2001)). Second, and more
importantly, one should bear in mind that our information structure is less restrictive than many other
papers because the decision whether to deliver or breach is made under asymmetric information, meaning
parties’ valuations are not observable. Indeed, renegotiation under such condition is by no means a costless
process. Models which account for renegotiation typically assume that parties’ valuations at the trade-orrenegotiate stage are observable. (Hart & Moore (1988), Chung (1991), Noldeke & Schmidt (1995), Spier
& Whinston 1995, Edlin & Reichelstein (1996)). Third, some argue that parties may find ways to prevent
renegotiation, or at least find ways to raise its costs significantly. Maskin and Tirole (1999) analyze several
ways parties can commit to not renegotiate. Hart & Moore (1999) provide interesting responses. Fourth,
even if renegotiation is simple, this paper provides a bench mark for assessing the change due to
renegotiation (see Rogerson (1992)). Lastly, as Hart & Moore (1999) recently noted, both cases where
parties can and cannot commit to not renegotiate- are worthy of study. As Hart and Moore argue, the
degree of the parties' ability to committing not to renegotiate "is something about which reasonable people
can disagree."
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(1983) famously showed in a mechanism design paper with asymmetric information at
the interim stage that first-best is impossible to achieve, assuming that both the incentivecompatibility and individual-rationality constraints hold . (See also Diamond & Maskin
(1979) and Stole (1992)). Because the parties own private information prior to
contracting, the terms proposed reveal their private information to the other party. This
signaling can lead to distortions in the contract which undermine the efficiency. To
overcome the impossibility of Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983), scholars have studied
mechanisms that are formed at the ex-ante stage, before parties learned their own
valuations, when they are symmetrically (un)informed. D’Aspremont & Gerard-Varet
(1979), Konakayama, Mitsui & Watanabe (1986), and Rogerson (1992) are all such
articles. In general, depending on the particular information structure they applied, firstbest was shown to be achievable.
Our work is different in two respects. First, while our focus in the article is also
on the ex-ante contract design, our work goes beyond these papers in that we assume
(like Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983)) that a party’s valuation after she has learned it, is
not observable to the other party. Instead, parties at the ex-ante stage anticipate that at the
trade-or-breach stage, they will face asymmetric information and therefore consider the
other’s valuation as a random variable. As proved in Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey (1994) and Noldeke and Schmidt (1995), in some environments a simple
contract plus a renegotiation plan can replace a complex contingent contract to achieve
efficient outcomes. We in contrast explore whether a simple contract can mimic a
contingent one to achieve efficiency when the information is unobservable at the interim
stage and renegotiation is prohibitively costly. We, therefore, restrict our attention to
simple fixed-term contracts. We demonstrate in Section 5 that a simple fixed-term
sequential option contract can approach first best under two-sided uncertainty and
asymmetric information.
The second difference in our work is that it is a “contract design” paper and not a
“mechanism design” paper. Mechanism-design contracts, which are much more complex
than our contract, have been criticized for faring poorly with respect to simplicity of their
design, ease of their enforcement and robustness to renegotiation (Tirole, 1986, Rogerson
1992, Harmelin & Katz, 1993). They are also susceptible to courts’ errors (Zhang & Zhu
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2000). We, therefore, restrict our attention to non-contingent contracts, which are more
commonly used in practice and are easier to enforce.
Within the non-contingent contract-design branch of literature, one can find fixedprice contracts, with or without damage clauses. Shavell (1980, 1984), Rogerson (1984),
Aghion & Bolton (1989), Chung (1992), Spier & Whinston (1995), Edlin and Reichestein
(1996), Miceli (1997), Zhu (2000), Zhang & Zhu (2000) are all such articles. These
papers usually deal with one-sided uncertainty with or without accounting for possible
renegotiation between the buyer and the seller. Some of these articles, following Shavell
(1980, 1984) and Rogerson (1984), compared several commonly used damage measures
and the incentives they provide for parties to breach and rely. Edlin (1998) and Edlin &
Schwartz (2003) are excellent surveys.
But, as before, the information structure matters. Like Shavell (1980), our paper
assumes that renegotiation is prohibitively costly and that the traded good is indivisible.
Unlike Shavel (1980) though our work deals with two-sided uncertainty and, unlike Edlin
& Reichelstein (1996), we assume asymmetry of information even at the trade date.
Closer to our information structure is Stole (1992), who analyzed contracts with
asymmetric information and without accounting for investments and renegotiation.27
Stole demonstrated that the optimal liquidated damages are always below full expectation
damages, thus justifying the penalty doctrine. We show, in contrast, that when liquidated
damages are not exclusive, they can well be above the expectation damages. We differ
from Stole (1992) though in that in our model, parties contract at the ex-ante stage
(before they have learned their private information; although they anticipate to learn it by
the time the seller would have to decide whether or not to deliver).

27

In his setting the Seller’s costs were common knowledge. Yet, the informational asymmetry arose from
two sources. First, the buyer’s valuation, which was her private information. Second, from a third-party’s (a
buyer’s) offer to the Seller, which was the Seller’s private information.
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4. The model- with liquidated damages
4.1The setting.
At Time 1 a seller-supplier and a buyer-manufacturer (both are risk-neutral) enter
a contract for the sale of a single unit of indivisible goods that the buyer-manufacturer
needs for its production of the finished goods. The seller receives the money upon
performance, that is, when he supplies the good sometime in the future, call it Time 2.
Among other things, the parties agree on a price and liquidated damages to be paid in
case the seller does not deliver in Time 2. There is uncertainty about seller’s cost of
production due to future fluctuations in the market prices for the inputs for the materials
the seller promised to deliver. Thus it is assumed that seller’s costs, c , is drawn from a
density function f( c ) with cumulative density function denoted F( c ) in the interval
[ c, c ]. There is also uncertainty about buyer’s valuation of the contract due to future

fluctuations in the market prices of the products the buyer ultimately manufactures and
sells. Thus, it is assumed that buyer’s valuation, v , is drawn from a density function g( v )
with cumulative density function denoted G( v ) in the interval [ v, v ], where G(.) and F(.)
are independent.28 This two-side uncertainty at Time 1 is what makes the determination
of liquidated damages difficult. What is clear, however, is that by the time the parties’
dispute will be deliberated in courts, call it Time 3, both parties will have learned the new
market prices. The seller will know his costs and the buyer’s her valuation. The following
chart presents the timeline.
Chart 1- Time line for the model with liquidated damages.
1____________________________________2_________________________3
Parties

Parties learn

seller

Court decides

enter a

new information

delivers

and parties obey

contract

28

or breaches

Our basic results apply to the case of correlated distributions as well.
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At Time 1, the seller and the buyer are symmetrically uninformed about each
other’s as well as their own valuation. They enter a contract with a price, p , and
liquidated damages clause, d . Without loss of generality, and for simplicity, we assume
that the buyer has the entire bargaining power so the seller’s surplus from the contract is
assumed to be zero. This entails that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of both
the price, p , and the amount of the liquidated damages, d .29
We note that the price and liquidated damages written in the contract are
correlated and reflect the legal regime employed by the courts that the parties are
expected to face at Time 3, if the seller does not deliver at Time 2. Importantly, we allow
the parties to decide in Time 1 about the mechanism by which the liquidated damages
will be paid upon breach. This will be called either a Regular Legal Regime (RLR) or an

Option to Enforce Regime (OER). More on this below.
In the interim period between Time 1 and Time 2, both parties learn their true
valuation but cannot make any changes to the contract between them (no renegotiation
after Time 1). Possible justifications for the parties learning more about their true
valuation only after Time 1 is that new information that was unknown before (but which
was anticipated to be known later) is now revealed. For example, the seller learned his
exact cost of performance after OPEC withdrew its threat to raise oil prices, or, the buyer
learned that the product she intends to manufacture was approved by some federal agency
for distribution in the US, and so forth.
At Time 2 the seller, after learning his exact cost of performance, decides whether
to deliver the good or breach. In making his decision the seller takes into account the
price and liquidated damages agreed upon in Time 1 and the legal regime parties are
expected to face at Time 3, if the seller does not deliver. The buyer’s valuation is not
observable to the seller (or verifiable to third parties). Instead, the seller continues to
consider the buyer’s valuation as a random variable.
At Time 3 the court does not hear evidence about the damages that the breach of
the promise to deliver caused but rather always enforces the agreement between the
parties, including the legal regime parties agreed on. Specifically, at Time 3, there are
29

Our results remain the same for any allocation of bargaining power,

θ , between the parties.
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two possible regimes that the court can apply. First, a RLR, in which if the seller decides
to breach he pays damages that are equal to the liquidated damages, d R . We call it
Regular Legal Regime, because this is the legal regime the literature considers for
liquidated damages. Second, an OER legal regime, in which the buyer can insist on
getting specific performance over receiving the liquidated damages, d O .30 If the buyer
chooses to get the liquidated damages, the seller can then pay the liquidated damages.
Yet, if the buyer chooses specific performance, the seller must deliver. At Time 3, when
the buyer makes her decisions, the seller’s realized cost of performance is not observable
to the buyer or verifiable to the court.31
We now compare the incentives to breach and parties’ expected payoffs under
RLR versus under OER.
4.2Analysis
4.2.1 Regular Liability Regime.
When the legal regime is RLR, (that is when the seller can choose in Time 3 whether
to deliver or breach and pay the liquidated damages), the buyer offers the seller in Time 1
a take-it-or-leave-it contract ( p R , d R ), where p R is the price under RLR and d R is the
liquidated damages under RLR. Price is payable upon performance. The seller will get
p R − c if she performs, and ( − d R ) if she breaches. Therefore, she will breach if
c > p R + d R . We denote k R ≡ p R + d R where k R is the breach threshold. The seller will

therefore breach if c > k R . If the contract is accepted by the seller, the buyer will get an
expected payoff which is equal to:
30

To keep this already long paper somewhat shorter we consider here only the option to enforce and do not
consider buyer’s option to recover actual damages. In a separate working paper we consider that regime as
well.
31
This is a major difference between our model and the models considered in the literature on incomplete
contracts. Like other models in the literature we assume that parties in Time 1 only observe each other‘s
distributions. In addition to that we also assume that parties do not know their own valuation, but rather
have only an estimate of it. Parties in this sense are symmetrically uninformed: they both observe nothing
but their own and each other’s distributions. No private information exists. In Time 2 asymmetry of
information is introduced. Parties learned their own valuation but still cannot observe (and definitely not
verify) their opponent’s valuation, but only its initial distribution. Observe that our model is a sequential
game. We believe that a sequential game more realistically captures real life situations. The results do not
change though even if we model it as a simultaneous game.
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π RB = F (k R )[ E (v) − pR ] + [1 − F (k R )]d R
The first term on the right-hand-side represents the buyer’s expected payoff when the
seller decides to perform, and the second term represents the expected payoff when the
seller decides to breach.
The seller’s expected payoff (if she accepts the contract) is:

π RS = F (k R )[ pR − E (c / c ≤ k R )] + [1 − F (k R )](− d R )
The first term represents the seller’s expected payoff if he performs, and the second term
represents his expected payoff if he breaches.
By assumption, the buyer has the entire bargaining power and therefore can
extract the entire ex-ante surplus, which means that the participation constraint is binding.
Note however that ex-post the seller might get some positive payoff (informational rent)
because he possesses private information about his- by then realized- production cost.
The buyer will choose k R to maximize the joint payoff and then manipulate the
price to guarantee the seller a zero expected payoff,
kR

Max π + π = F (k R ) E (v) − ∫ cdF (c).
kR

B
R

S
R

c

The equilibrium is summarized in Lemma 1:

Lemma 1

Under RLR with Liquidated Damages, the equilibrium is:
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d =π
*
R

B*
R

E (v)

=

∫ F (c)dc,
c

E (v)

p = E ( v ) − d = E (v ) −
*
R

*
R

∫ F (c)dc,
c

*

π RS = 0.
Comments:
(a) It is a standard result in contract theory that expectation damages (under RLR)
induce an optimal level of breach. But these models generally assume one-sided
uncertainty, eg. Miceli (1997, p 73).
(b) Observe that d R = E (v) − p R means that the amount of liquidated damages that
the buyer offers equals the amount of expected expectation damages. Thus,
although from the ex-ante perspective the liquidated damages induce an optimal
level of breach, this does not guarantee an optimal level of breach from the ex-

post perspective. Specifically, in this case the seller breaches whenever c ≥ E (v) .
This is inefficient in cases in which v > c > E (v) , where v and c represent the expost buyer’s valuation and seller’s costs, respectively. Conversely, the seller will
deliver whenever c < E (v) , and this is inefficient in cases in which v < c < E (v) .

4.2.2 Option to Enforce Regime.
When the legal regime is OER, (that is when the buyer can insist, upon breach, on
specific performance), the buyer offers the seller in Time 1 a take-it-or-leave-it contract
( pO , d O ), where pO is the price under OER and d O is the liquidated damages under
OER. Price is payable upon performance. As before, denoting the breach threshold
k O ≡ pO + d O will be useful. Obviously, the buyer will insist on delivery if v ≥ k O and
will agree to breach otherwise. If the seller performs he will receive pO − c . The seller’s
expected payoff when he attempts to breach is G (k O )(− d O ) + [1 − G (k O )]( pO − c) . Hence,
if c ≥ k O the seller will prefer to breach; otherwise he will deliver.
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If the seller accepts the contract, the buyer will get an expected payoff of:

π OB = F (kO )[E(v) − pO ] + [1 − F (kO )]{G(kO )d O + [1 − G(kO )][E(v / v ≥ kO ) − pO ]},
The first term on the right-hand-side represent s the buyer’s payoff if the seller performs.
The second term represents the payoff if the seller attempts to breach. The first term in
the curly parentheses is the payoff when the buyer agrees to the breach, and the second
term is the payoff when she insists on specific performance. Similarly, the seller’s
expected payoff (if she accepts the contract) is:

π OS = F (k O )[ pO − E (c / c ≤ k O )] + [1 − F (k O )]{G (k O )(−d O ) + [1 − G (k O )][ pO − E (c / c ≥ k O )]}.
The first term on the right-hand-side represents the seller’s payoff when he chooses to
perform. The second term represents his payoff when he attempts to breach the contract.
The first term in the curly parentheses is the payoff when the buyer agrees to the breach,
and the second term is the payoff when the buyer insists on specific performance.
As before, the buyer can chose k O to maximize the joint payoff and then manipulate the
price to guarantee the seller a zero expected payoff,
Max
kO

v

c

kO

kO

π OB + π OS = F(kO )E(v) + [1 − F(kO )]∫ vdG(v) + G(kO ) ∫ cdF(c) − E(c).

Denote h( x) ≡

(4.1)

f ( x)
g ( x)
h( x )
, κ ( x) ≡
, and λ ( x) ≡
. 32 We have the following
1 − F ( x)
G ( x)
h( x ) + κ ( x )

Lemma 2:

Lemma 2 The joint expected equilibrium payoff is

h(x) is the hazard rate of c , i.e., the probability of c = x given that c ≥ x . κ (x) is the probability of
v = x given that v ≤ x ; λ (x) measures the relative sizes of these two probabilities.

32
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*

π OB = F (k O* )[ E (v) − E (c / c ≤ k O* )] + [1 − F (k O* )][1 − G ( k O* )][ E (v / v ≥ k O* ) − E (c / c ≥ k O* )],
where k O* is the solution to
k O* = λ (k O* ) E (v / v ≤ k O* ) + [1 − λ (k O* )]E (c / c ≥ k O* ).

(4.2)

Proof: The first order condition of the buyer’s maximization problem above is:
kO
 c

[ ∫ vdG (v) − k O G (k O )] f (k O ) +  ∫ cdF (c) − k O [1 − F (k O )] g (k O ) = 0.
kO

v

(4.2) follows from (4.3).

(4.3)

QED.

Remark. When setting the breach threshold, the buyer faces a trade-off. Increasing k O
(holding pO constant, but increasing d O ) will increase the damages she receives from
the seller in the event of breach, yet the seller’s probability of breach incentive is reduced
as a result of the higher damages. Balancing this trade-off, the optimal breach threshold,
k O* , is the weighted sum of the buyer's lower-than-threshold truncated expected value and

the seller's higher-than-threshold truncated expected cost, as can be seen in 3.1 above.

Uniform Distribution Example: If c is uniformly distributed on [c, c] , and v is uniformly
distributed on [v, v] , then we derive from (3.2): k O* = (c + v) / 2 . The optimal breach
threshold is the midpoint of the buyer’s lower-bound and the seller’s upper-bound values.
It is the midpoint of the specific intersection of the parties' distributions in which the
uncertainty whether the buyer's valuation or the seller's cost is greater exists (in all other
regions, the choice is easy). The following diagram represents it:
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Area of uncertain
optimal allocation
v

kO*

v

c

c

Figure 1. Optimal Breach Threshold with Uniform Distribution

Interestingly, under OER the breach threshold, k O* , can be larger or smaller than the
breach threshold under RLR, which was E (v ). Lemma 3 determines the conditions at
which the threshold under OER will be larger than the threshold under RLR.

Lemma 3

If g ( E (v ))[1 − F ( E (v ))][ E (c / c ≥ E (v )) − E (v )] < f ( E (v ))G ( E (v ))[ E (v ) − E (v / v ≤ E (v))],
then k O* < E (v ).
Proof: See the appendix.
Remark. (a) Lemma 3 suggests that the relative scale of two effects around the critical
value E (v ) ,which was the optimal breach threshold under RLR, determines whether k O*
is above or below E (v ) . Suppose that under OER we still set the breach threshold at
E (v ) . Then one effect is in force when the buyer’s value is E (v ) , and the seller’s cost of

performance is above E (v ) (this happens with probability g ( E (v))[1 − F ( E (v)] ). In this
case, the seller wants to breach but the buyer is indifferent between breach and
performance. Breach is efficient in this case, and the seller’s expected cost savings from
successful breach is the forgone expected cost minus the damages that he would have
needed to pay, E (v ) . The other effect occurs when the seller’s cost is E (v ) and the
buyer’s value of performance is below

E (v )

(this happens with probability

f ( E (v))G ( E (v)) ). In this case, the buyer wants the seller to breach but the seller is
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indifferent between breach and performance. Breach is efficient in this case, and the
buyer’s expected gain from breach is the damages she would have received, E (v ) , minus
her expected value. If the first effect is dominated by the second effect, the buyer
(contract designer) will have an incentive to lower the breach threshold from E (v ) to
encourage the seller to breach.
(b) Notice that our result is different from Stole (1992). Stole showed that efficient
stipulated damages are always under-compensatory (and thus the penalty doctrine is
justified). He showed in other words that k * < E (v) always holds. Yet, in our model this
result does not always hold. If the condition in Lemma 3 is not satisfied we might have
over-compensatory damages (even without considering the strategic effect to the third
parties, see Edlin and Schwartz (2003) for a concise summary of the literature). The
difference between our result and Stole's is due to the different informational structure
and the proposed OER where the liquidated damages clause is not exclusive; a regime
that Stole does not consider.
Which legal regime, RLR or OER, will induce more breach is not clear. Lemma 4
determines the conditions under which OER will induce less breach than RLR.
Lemma 4 If k O* ≥ E (v ), then the OER contract induces less expected breach than RLR

does.
Proof: Under RLR, if c > k R* = E (v) , i.e., with probability 1 − F ( E (v)) the seller
will breach. Under OER, the seller actually breaches only if c > k O* and v < k O* . This
happens

with

probability

[1 − F (k O* )]G (k O* ) .

k O* ≥ E (v)

implies

that

[1 − F (k O* )]G ( k O* ) ≤ [1 − F ( E (v ))]G ( k O* ) < 1 − F ( E (v)) .

The question that we are left with is whether RLR or OER yields a higher joint payoff.
Proposition 1 summarizes.
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Proposition 1 In an environment of two-sided uncertainty and private information, OER

is Pareto superior to RLR, if E (v / v ≥ E (v )) > E (c / c ≥ E (v )) .
Proof: See the appendix.

Remarks. (a) Observe that for OER to dominate RLR the buyer’s expected valuation
should be greater than the seller’s expected cost, so long as both values are higher than
E (v ) . Recall from Lemma 1 that E (v ) is the optimal breach threshold under RLR.

Indeed, under RLR whenever the seller’s cost is higher than this threshold, he will breach
the contract. The interesting question is whether it is then efficient to breach the contract.
Proposition 1 states that OER Pareto dominates RLR whenever the buyer’s meanvaluation above the RLR breach threshold is higher than the seller’s mean-cost above that
threshold. Indeed, in that case from the ex-ante perspective, performance is more likely to
be efficient than breach. The buyer is likely to value the good at more than the seller’s
cost. Under these circumstances shifting from RLR to OER, and thus providing the buyer
with the option to insist on performance, is efficiency-enhancing.
(b) In the special case of uniform distributions, where c is distributed U [ µ S − s, µ S + s ] ,
and V is distributed U [ µ B − b, µ B + b] , the condition stated in Proposition 1 can be
reduced to: µ B − µ S > s − b . This means that OER dominates RLR whenever the
difference between parties’ means is larger than the half of the difference in their ranges.
Observe that the range is a proxy for the uncertainty in the buyer’s ultimate valuation and
the seller’s ultimate costs. Thus for OER to dominate RLR, the buyer’s uncertainty
should be larger than the seller’s uncertainty, and this excess uncertainty should be larger
than the initial mean advantage that the buyer has over the seller.33 The intuition for this
result is simple. Observe that OER leads to more performance than RLR. Given the
buyer’s larger ex-ante mean, this is a move in the right direction. Yet, sometimes the
seller’s range of costs can be so large, that he is likely to end up having very high costs.
In that case it is better to not perform the contract. The condition µ B − µ S > s − b defines
the balance between these two effects- the mean effect and the range effect.
33

Ex-ante, the buyer has always a larger mean-valuation then the Seller’ mean costs. Otherwise, risk
neutral parties would have never entered the contract in the first place.
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(c) Because neither of the legal regimes is unconditionally superior, courts should allow
the parties to choose the type of legal regime they prefer. Specifically, the buyer should
be allowed to offer the seller either an RLR-like contract, ( p R , d R ) , or an OER-like
contract, ( pO , d O ) . The seller is indifferent as his expected payoff is always zero. But, for
the buyer the choice of legal regime is important. As the buyer can observe both
distributions in Time 1, she will prefer the ( pO , d O ) contract whenever the condition
stated in Proposition 1 is met; otherwise she will prefer the ( p R , d R ) contract. The
buyer's choice of contracts renders this regime to be always Pareto superior to the current
RLR regime. Proposition 2 summarizes:
Proposition 2 In a regime of double-sided uncertainty where specific performance and

liquidated damages clauses are honored, allowing parties to choose the legal regime
(RLR or OER) is Pareto superior to RLR and OER. .
4.3 Two numerical examples
4.3.1 A simple example- uniform distributions.
Suppose that due to the fluctuations in the market prices of the inputs, the seller’s
cost of production, at Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from the uniform distribution
f(.)= uniform [10,70]. Similarly, due to fluctuations in the market prices of the products
the buyer ultimately manufactures and sells, the buyer’s best estimate of her valuation, at
Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from the uniform distribution g(.)=uniform [30,90].
This is each side’s Time 1 estimation of its own valuation of the good, as well as of the
other party’s valuation. Observe that risk neutral parties will enter the contract because
buyer’s mean valuation, 60, is larger than seller’s mean production costs, 40. Table 1
compares the two legal regimes discussed.
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Table 1- A Comparison of the Legal Regimes – liquidated damages
Regime

d

p

πB

πS

RLR

20.83

39.17

20.83

0

OER

11.11

38.89

22.22

0

Table 1 shows that the buyer in Time 1 will prefers to switch from RLR to OER
whereas the seller is indifferent. In return for receiving a somewhat lower price ex-ante
(38.89 instead of 39.17) the seller gets a large discount on the damages he might need to
pay in the event of a breach. As can be seen, while maintaining seller’s payoff constant,
the buyer’s expected payoff increased, making the switch a Pareto improvement.34
One may wonder whether the change in the joint payoff from 20.83 to 22.22 is
important. Yet notice that this is a 6.67% increase in the joint payoff just from writing a
better contract. Moreover, the switch from specific performance to liquidated damages, a
widely celebrated change by legal economists, yields a 4.1% increase in the joint
payoff.35
Lastly, the previous example should not lead one to believe that OER is always
better than RLR. It is only when the conditions in Proposition 1 above hold (as they do in
the simple numerical example) that OER yields a higher joint payoff. The next example
explores this point more thoroughly.
4.3.2 A more complicated example- normal distributions.
When parties distributions are normally distributed, analytically solving the model
for the contracts pO , d O and p R , d R becomes much harder. We therefore solved it
numerically. First, without loss of generality, we assumed that the buyer’s valuations are
normally distributed with a mean of 18.5 and a standard deviation of 2.5. Second, we
34

As shown in Lemma A2 in the appendix, the damages under OER contracts will sometimes be larger
than the damages under RLR and sometimes lower.
35
Observe that under RLR the Seller agrees to a contract price of $39.17, which is below his mean costs.
This is because the Seller knows that in the state of the word in which his costs are high (C>60), she does
not have to perform and can get away with paying only $20.83.
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assumed that the seller’s costs are normally distributed with a relatively low mean and
standard deviation. Without loss of generality, we assumed the seller’s mean equals 14.5
and the standard deviation equals 1.2. Third, we calculated pO , d O and p R , d R only to
find the joint payoff for both the OER and the RLR contracts. Fourth, we plotted the ratio
between the joint payoffs. Fifth, we increased the uncertainty about the seller’s valuation
(as represented by the standard deviation) by 0.2 and performed the above routine again.
We continued performing these 5 steps and increasing the standard deviation by 0.2 until
the standard deviation was equal 4.4. Observe at this point that we solved the model for a
seller whose mean valuation is relatively low, while manipulating the uncertainty about
his valuation (as represented by the standard deviation) from a standard deviation of 1.2
(which is much lower than the buyer’ standard valuation) to a much larger of standard
deviation of 4.4.
The sixth and last step was to increase the mean by 0.5 and do all the above steps
again. Thus, in effect, we calculated the ratio of the joint payoffs under OER and RLR for
all iterations between the buyer and the seller, where the latter’s valuation was assumed
to be normally distributed with a mean between 14.5 to 20 and standard variation
between 1.2 to 4.4. Observe that we allow for the seller's mean to be higher than the
Buyer's mean. Parties may nevertheless contract in such cases due to seller's option to
breach. The next graph presents our results.
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Graph 1- A Comparison of the Legal Regimes

The Z-axis in Graph 1 presents the ratio of the joint payoffs under OER and RLR.
The middle of the Z-axis is the 1:1 point where both regimes yield the same joint payoff.
The X-axis presents the seller’s possible standard deviations (which runs from 1.2 to 4.4),
whereas the Y axis presents his possible means (which runs from 14.5 to 20).
Graph 1 shows that when the seller’s mean is relatively low, both regimes yield
roughly the same joint payoff, despite the relative difference between their respective
standard deviations. The intuition behind this result is that when the seller’s costs are
relatively low, he will always perform. Thus, neither the RLR, which allows him to
breach and pay damages, or the OER which allows the buyer to insist on performance,
are required to induce performance.
Graph 1 also shows a peak on the upper left side and a valley on the upper right
side of the graph. Starting with the valley, Graph 1 shows that the larger the seller’s mean
and standard deviations become, the more efficient RLR becomes relative to OER. The
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intuition is that when the parties’ means become closer to each other and, in addition,
there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the seller’s ex-post cost of production, then there is
a higher probability that the seller’s cost will exceed the buyer’ valuation. In those cases,
a rule which only grants the seller the option to breach and pay damages will be more
efficient. Indeed, this is exactly what RLR does.
Switching to the peak at the upper left side, Graph 1 shows that when the seller’s
mean is large yet his standard deviation is small, the better OER becomes relative to
RLR. The intuition is that when parties’ means are close to each other and there is not
much uncertainty about the seller’s ex-post cost of production, then there is a higher
probability that the buyer’s valuation will exceed the seller’s cost. In those cases a rule
that also grants the buyer an option to insist on performance will be more efficient.
Indeed, this is exactly what OER does.
Lastly, observe that when the seller's mean is higher than the buyer's mean of
18.5, RLR becomes better even for low seller's sigma. The reasons is that even with a low
sigma the seller is more likely to have a higher valuation, and therefore letting him decide
about the breach is superior.
Our numerical model enables us to take a closer look at the specific price and
damage clauses that the parties will agree on. Consider first the different prices that OER
and RLR contracts will have. A buyer’s subsequent option to enforce makes the seller
worse off under the same price and damage term because he loses the power to
unilaterally breach. Thus, one would expect that the buyer will “compensate” the seller
for the switch from an RLR contract to an OER contract, either by offering a higher price
or by allowing the seller to pay lower damages in case of a breach, or any combination
the two. Indeed, our numerical example confirms this intuition. The buyer will “bribe”
the seller to switch from the RLR to OER contract, with either a higher price, lower
damages, or both. Graphs 2a and 2b in the appendix present the results.
An interesting result of our research is that sometimes parties will agree on
negative damages under the OER contract. As is shown in the appendix, when the seller’s
sigma is relatively small, the stipulated damages that the seller will have to pay in case of
a contract breach are negative. That is, in these circumstances, when the seller attempts to
breach the contract, the buyer might well agree to pay to the seller the predetermined
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stipulated amount in order to prevent the seller from performing.36 We demonstrate this
claim and explain its intuition in the appendix.
4.4 The desirability of an ex-ante contract.
In our model parties are not required to make investments prior to the seller’s
decision whether to breach and the buyer’s decision whether to agree or insist on
performance. One may wonder whether parties would be better off waiting until they
learn their valuations and then sign a contract. Contracting at a later stage might be
presumably more efficient, because more information is on the table.37
The reason that parties bother writing a contract at all at the ex-ante stage when
no investments are required is that at this stage they are symmetrically informed, or more
accurately, symmetrically uninformed. In contrast, in the interim stage after they learn
their own valuations they are asymmetrically informed. Designing a contract under
information asymmetry is not an easy task due to the parties’ strategic behavior. Indeed, a
contract designed in the interim stage is not necessarily more efficient than even a simple
fixed-terms contract designed in the ex-ante stage. The benefits from the increase of
information in the interim stage does not necessarily outweigh the disadvantages of the
parties’ strategic attempts to extract more rent.
Before we demonstrate this claim, it is useful to recall that scholars applying the
mechanism design approach largely agree that parties cannot achieve the first best in the
interim stage (Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983), Talley (1994)), but they can achieve it in
the ex-ante stage (D’Aspremont & Gerard-Varet (1979)), even when parties’
investments are required (Rogerson (1992), Che & Hausch (1999)). This means that
when contingent contracts are feasible meeting at the ex-ante stage is superior to meeting
at the interim stage even though more information is on the table at the interim stage.
Does that result carry to the non-contingent contracts world?
To check whether or not the simple ex-ante contract we described above is
superior to a contract designed in the interim stage, we compared the joint expected

36
37

Compare to Ayres and $$, threats for in efficient performance.
We thank Omri Ben-Shachar for bringing this issue to our attention.
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payoff in both contracts. In the ex-ante contract described above, the seller’s expected
payoff is always zero. Thus, the joint expected payoff in the contract is equal to the
buyer’s expected payoff.
To compute the joint payoff in the interim stage, one has to determine what type
of bargaining game the parties will play when they meet at that stage. In general, the
more sophisticated the bargaining game, the higher the joint payoff will be. To test the
desirability of the ex-ante contract, we compare it to two different types of interim
contracts: the second-best and the monopoly contracts.
The second-best interim contract
The second -best interim contract is the best contract achievable under asymmetry
of information a-la Myerson & Satterthwaite. Based on their formulation we compute the
second-best joint payoff without specifying the bargaining game. Thus, we get the joint
payoff for the best of all possible contracts in the interim stage. This will serve as the
upper bound of joint payoff at the interim stage.
To compute the second-best contract we followed Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983). We first defined:
c ( c, α ) = c + α

F (c )
,
f (c )

v (v, α ) = v − α

1 − G (v )
.
g (v )

Then we let p α (.,.) be defined by
p α (c, v) = 1 if
c (c, α ) ≤ v(v, α ),
= 0 if
c ( c, α ) > v (v , α ) .

(4.4)

(4.5)

We then numerically computed α from the equation (3):
v c

∫ ∫ ([v −
v c

1 − G (v )
F (c ) α
] − [c +
]) p (c, v)dF (c)dG (v) = 0 .
g (v )
f (c )

(4.6)

After we found α we plugged it back in (4.4) and (4.5) to find
c(c, α ), v(v, α )
and
p α (c , v )
Lastly, we calculated the expected (ex ante) payoff of a Myerson-Satterthwaite contract is
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v c

Eπ ms = ∫ ∫ (v −c) p α (c, v)dF (c)dG (v)

(4.7)

v c

A Monopoly contract
To get a worse interim contract we chose the monopoly contract where the buyer,
who knows her own valuations and observes seller’s distribution of costs, makes the
seller a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the seller agrees, the good is traded; if he does not
agree, the good is not traded. The seller has no opportunity to breach, and therefore the
buyer has no opportunity to insist on performance. Renegotiation is not possible. This
design is not only the simplest we could think of, but it is also the closest design to the
contract at the ex-ante stage. We believe it could serve as a reasonable bench mark for a
worse interim contract.
The buyer whose private valuation is v , makes a take-it-leave-it offer to purchase
the good for a price, p I . The seller, whose private costs are c , either accepts it or rejects
it.
The buyer’s problem is

Max F ( p I )(v − p I )
pI

The first-order condition gives us the implicit formula for the optimal price p I* :38
p I* = v − F ( p I* ) / f ( p I* )
If the seller’s costs are higher than p I* , then he would reject the offer and both parties
will have a payoff of zero; if the seller’s costs are lower than p I* , then the expected
interim payoffs for the buyer and the seller are, respectively:

π IB (v) = F ( p I* )(v − p I* ) = F 2 ( p I* ) / f ( p I* ) .
π IS (c) = p I* − c = v − c − F ( p I* ) / f ( p I* ) .
38

Notice that the assumption that the Seller with costs lower than this price accepts this offer depends
heavily on the no-renegotiation assumption. Otherwise, depending on the negotiation game, the seller can
*

*

infer the buyer’s value v from the offer p I (v ) , and might reject p I (v ) , only to make a counter-offer

p S = v −1 ( p I* ) (i.e., the buyer’s value) to extract rent from the buyer. A way to justify the no renegotiation assumption is to imagine a single buyer making a take-it-or-leave-it offers to many sellers,
(whose costs are distributed along F ). In such a scenario, all sellers whose costs are lower than the offer
will accept the offer. The contract will then be signed with one of them with equal probability.
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In order to compare the interim contract to the ex-ante contract, we need to account
for all possible valuations, v, that the buyer might have. Accordingly, from the ex-ante
perspective, the expected payoffs of the interim contract is:
V

Eπ IB = ∫ F 2 ( p I* (v)) / f ( p I* (v))dG (v)
V

*
V pI ( v )

Eπ = ∫
S
I

V

∫ [v − c − F ( p

*
I

(v)) / f ( p I* (v))]dF (c)dG (v)

C

And the total expected ex-ante payoff of the interim contract is:
*
V pI ( v )

Eπ I = ∫
V

∫ (v − c)dF (c)dG(v)

(4.8)

C

Graphs 5a and 5b present the ratio of the joint expected payoff of the interim
contracts (from (4.7) and (4.8) above) and the joint expected payoff of the best ex-ante
contract. Before we discuss the results, we would like to define the “best ex-ante
contract.” The “best ex-ante contract” is the contract that parties will enter at the ex-ante
stage. It can be a RLR or an OER, depending on their relative valuations. While both the
RLR and the OER yield on average higher joint payoff than the interim contract, the
“best contract”, naturally, yields an even higher joint payoff.
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Graph 5a- The Ex-ante contract and the Second-Best Interim Contract
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Graph 5b- The Ex-ante contract and the Monopoly Interim Contract
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Graphs 5a and 5b show that in general the best ex-ante contract is superior to both
the monopoly and the second-best contracts. There is an exception though. Whenever the
seller’s mean is very close to the buyer’s mean, or larger than it, and seller’s sigma is
relatively low, the parties would be better off to wait for the interim stage before they
enter a simple fixed-terms contact.

4.5 The Two-Price contract.
So far, to highlight the role of the option to enforce, we have assumed that in the
OER contract, if the buyer insists on performance she could get performance and still pay
the original price, pO . We now relax this restriction in the Option to Enforce Regime. In
this section we consider the possibility that the OER contract will stipulate two different
prices for the two scenarios of performance (clearly seen from the game tree below,
Figure 3)----one is the seller’s voluntary performance in the first place; the other is the
seller’s involuntary performance, which is resulted from the buyer’s insistence. We
surely can differentiate these two scenarios in optimal contracting. Specifically, we add
an additional variable, ∆ , to the model, where ∆ is an additional price the buyer needs to
pay in the case she insists on performance. Thus, the buyer offers the following contract
to the seller: ( pO , pO + ∆, d O ) . The game tree is as follows:

Insists on performance
Proposes breach

( p O + ∆ − c, v − p O − ∆ )

B
Agrees to breach

S
Performs

(−d O , d O )

( p O − c, v − p O )
Figure 4. Option-to-Enforce game with two-price contract
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Does a two-price contract yield a higher joint payoff than a Single-Price contract?
On the one hand, ∆ provides us another tool to use. The fact that when the buyer insists
on performance she needs to add a ∆ to compensate the seller, makes it similar to an
ascending auction. In the Single-Price contract the seller attempts to breach at the first
round if his ex-post cost is higher than ( pO + d O ) . When the buyer insists on
performance she reveals that her ex-post valuation is also higher than ( pO + d O ) . But
from an ex-post efficiency perspective we cannot know whether the buyer’s valuation is
higher than the seller’s. A two-price contract which demands the buyer add a ∆ if she
insists on performance brings it closer to first-best, because it tells us that the buyer’s
valuation is not only higher than ( pO + d O ) but also higher than pO + d O + ∆ . This
effect should increase efficiency.
On the other hand, there is a negative effect that ∆ will cause. In the Single-Price
contract the seller attempted to breach only if his cost was truly above the breach
threshold, ( pO + d O ) . In contrast, in the two-price contract the seller might strategically
attempt to breach even if his cost is lower than the damages level. The seller might
breach in order to extract, with some probability, an extra ∆ from the buyer. This
strategic behavior might decrease efficiency.
Which of the two effects is stronger? Intuitively, a Two-Price contract should be
superior to a Single-Price contract. A Single-Price contract is equivalent to a Two-Price
contract where ∆ is equal to zero. Thus, once the restriction that ∆ is equal to zero is
removed--- as is the case in a two-price contract---one would expect the joint payoff to
increase. Put differently, the buyer who makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer knows that the
seller might behave strategically and can always choose a ∆ equal to zero to prevent it. If
she chooses a ∆ larger than zero, it must yield her a higher expected payoff. Since the
seller’s expected payoff is equal to zero, a higher expected payoff for the buyer entails a
higher joint expected payoff.
More formally, we assume that the buyer offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract
( pO , pO + ∆, d O ) to the seller. The buyer will insist on performance if v ≥ pO + d O + ∆
and will agree to the breach otherwise. If the seller performs, he will receive a payoff of
pO − c ;

if

he

attempts

to

breach

the

contract,

his

expected

payoff

is
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G ( pO + d O + ∆ )(− d O ) + [1 − G ( pO + d O + ∆ )]( pO + ∆ − c) . Hence, the seller will perform
if c ≤ pO + d O + ∆ − [∆ / G ( pO + d O + ∆ )] , and will attempt to breach otherwise.
We denote the seller’s breach threshold as pO + d O + ∆ − [∆ / G ( pO + d O + ∆ )] ≡ k1 , and
the buyer’s threshold as pO + d O + ∆ ≡ k 2 . Viewing sequential option exercising as an
internal, ascending auction process, we can see from the expression of k1 that the seller
will strategically overbid (with a term of ∆ / G ( pO + d O + ∆ ) ) in the first round, trying to
receive a higher price from the buyer in the next round. The buyer’s expected payoffs is:

π OB = F (k1 )[ E (v) − pO ] + [1 − F (k1 )]{G(k 2 )d O + [1 − G(k 2 )][ E (v v ≥ k 2 ) − pO − ∆]}.
The seller’s expected payoffs is:

π OS = F (k1 )[ pO − E (c c ≤ k1 )] + [1 − F (k1 )]{G (k 2 )(−d O ) + [1 − G (k 2 )][ pO + ∆ − E (c c ≥ k1 )]}.
As before the buyer will maximize the joint payoff, then manipulate pO to extract all
surplus from the seller. The buyer’s problem is:
v

c

k2

k1

Max π OB + π OS = F (k1 ) E (v) − E (c) + [1 − F (k1 )] ∫ vdG (v) + G (k 2 ) ∫ cdF (c).

{ pO ,d O ,∆ }

The first-order conditions are:
For p O or d O :
k2

 c
f (k1 )[1 + ∆g ( k 2 ) / G 2 (k 2 )][ ∫ vdG (v) − k1G (k 2 )] + g (k 2 ) ∫ cdF (c) − k 2 [1 − F (k1 )] = 0,

k1
v
For ∆ :

( 4. 9)

k2
 c

1
2
f (k1 )[1 −
+ ∆g (k 2 ) / G (k 2 )][ ∫ vdG (v) − k1G (k 2 )] + g (k 2 ) ∫ cdF (c) − k 2 [1 − F (k1 )] = 0.
G (k 2 )
k1

v

(4.10)

Subtracting (3.4) from (3.3) gives us
k2

∆ = ∫ G (v)dv

(4.11)

v
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It is easy to verify that p o* + d o* + ∆* > v .39 Equation 4.11 implies that ∆ > 0 , which
means that the buyer will never choose the Single-Price contract, despite seller’s strategic
behavior.
(4.10) and (4.11) imply:
k 2 = E ( c c ≥ k1 ) = E ( c c ≥ k 2 −

∆
),
G (k 2 )

(4.12)

The assumption that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer implies:
c

π = pO − E (c) + [1 − F (k1 )][∆ − k 2 G (k 2 )] + G (k 2 ) ∫ cdF (c) = 0.
S
O

(4.13)

k1

From equations (4.11)-(4.13), we can solve for p o* , d o* , and ∆* . Thus, we have
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 With two-price contract, OER is always Pareto superior to RLR.

Proof: As explained in footnote 30, if we choose pO = p R* , d O = d R* , pO + ∆ = v , the
resulting OER contract is equivalent to the optimal RLR contract.

QED.

Remark. (a) The two-price OER contract further partitions the information spaces of the
parties. A single-price OER contract partitions the buyer’s and the seller’s information
spaces using a single threshold value, k O* ; in contrast, a two-price OER contract partitions
the parties’ information spaces using two separate optimal threshold values, k1* and k 2* ,
and hence can further reduce the area of the inefficient regions.
(b) Figure 5 illustrates the three different remedies. The horizontal axis represents the
buyer’s possible valuations and the vertical axis represents the seller’s costs. The
diagonal represents an indifference line that divides the space into two possible
allocations. Above the line is the area where the seller’s costs are higher then the
Resident’s valuation; in that area to accomplish the first-best solution the seller should be
allowed to breach. Conversely, the area under the line is where the buyer’s valuation is
39

If p o + d o + ∆ ≤ v , then the buyer will always insist on performance, and the two-price Option-to*

*

*

Enforce contract is equivalent to specific performance, which is a regime that ignores parties’ private
information. This regime is less efficient than RLR (or OER) which take advantage of the parties' private
information. However, we can simply construct a feasible two-price Option-to-Enforce contract that is
equivalent to RLR---- p O = p R , d O = d R , p O + ∆ = v . Therefore, p o + d o + ∆ > v .
*

*

*
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higher than the seller’s costs; in that area to accomplish the first-best solution the buyer
should be allowed to insist on performance. Under RLR, only the seller’s information
space is partitioned by E (v) . In equilibrium, there is inefficient breach in area B, and
inefficient performance in area C. Under OER, both parties’ information spaces are
*

partitioned using a single cut-off point--- k O . In equilibrium there is inefficient
performance in areas F and H. Under two-price OER, we use two different threshold
*

values--- k 1 and k

*
2

(which can be optimally tailored according to the distributions of

c and v )---to partition the parties’ information space, thus we can further reduce

inefficiencies. Without loss of generality, if k

*
2

> k 1* as depicted in the figure, there is

inefficient breach in area L, and inefficient performance in areas M and O.
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Figure 5. Comparison of Three Remedies

(c) One may wonder whether parties can do even better by designing a more general nrounds sequential options contract. For instance, one may consider granting the seller an
option to insist on a breach, but only if he pays higher damages, and then the buyer could
insist on performance, but only if she pays a higher price, so on and so forth. As we show
in Section 5 below such a contract can approach first best.
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5. Contracts under Higher-Order Sequential Option Remedy Regime

5.1 An n-Round Sequential Option Contract
The two-price OER contract resembles an ascending auction40, by further partitioning the
information space relative to the RLR contract. In the RLR contract, only the seller’s
information space is partitioned when he exercises his option to breach and pay damages.
In the two-price OER contract, the seller signals his information through the breach
decision in the first round, then the buyer in the second round signals her information
through insistence or not on the performance of the contract. Therefore, the two-price
OER contract reveals more information and can therefore lead to a more nuanced
allocation. Following this logic, if we add more rounds of sequential options to the game,
the parties’ information spaces can be further partitioned to smaller sub-intervals, leading
to a more efficient allocation. To following example demonstrates this claim for uniform
distributions.
Assume that both the seller’s cost and the buyer’s valuation are uniformly distributed on
the close interval [0,1] . The basic game is the following: At Time 0, the parties sign a
contract to trade some good (or service). At Time 1, the parties learn their private
valuations and decide whether to breach or not according to the rule they stipulated in the
contract. Specifically, the remedy is characterized by an n − round sequential options. We
will assume first that n is an even number, i.e., we will have n / 2 rounds of Option-toEnforce games, where the prices and damages are different in every round. (The case of
n being an odd number, where the seller unilaterally decides whether to breach in the

last round, can be analyzed in a similar way, which we will show below).
The parties stipulate the initial price to be p0( n ) .41 In the first round the seller has
an option to breach by paying damages d1( n ) ; but in the second round the buyer has a
subsequent option to insist on performance by paying a higher (than original price p0( n ) )
40

But here the revenue is not going to some third party as in a standard auction, it goes to the losing bidder
in what Ayres and Balkin called “internal” auction. Ayres and Balkin (1996) applied a similar idea to a
nuisance setting, in which the court can set multiple rounds of taking costs to induce efficient taking. We
study parties’ ex ante contracting under a multiple-round option remedy, while Ayres and Balkin (1996)
focus on courts’ ex post design of liability rules when parties cannot contract with each other.
41
The superscript ( n) indicates the values for an n-round sequential-option contract.
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price p1( n ) ; then at third round, the seller has a subsequent option to breach by paying a
higher lever of damages d 2( n ) ; at fourth round, the buyer has an option to insist on
performance by paying an even higher price p 2( n ) ;……; and so on, until to the final round
n , where the buyer can agree to breach by receiving damages d n( n/ )2 , or insist on

performance by paying price p n( n/)2 . Basically, there are a sequence of call options and
call-back options, where the subsequent option is actually an option to the option in the
preceding round. We assume there is no discounting between rounds.42
As before the results are applicable to the general scenario where the parties share
the bargaining power, for instance, the buyer receives a fraction α ( α ∈ [0,1] ) of the total
surplus, and the seller obtains the remainder. For expositional simplicity, however, we
will keep the assumption that the buyer has all of the bargaining power. Therefore, the
buyer

will

offer

the

seller

at

time

0

a

take-it-or-leave-it

contract

{ }{ }

( p0( n ) , pi( n ) , d i( n ) ) i =1, 2,...,( n / 2 ) . Then at Time 1, after the parties have learned their private

information, they will exchange the breach and insistence-on-performance messages,
with the corresponding price and damage as stipulated in the contract.
As we saw when we discussed the Two-Price OER contract, the parties will not
decide whether to exercise their options simply based on the price and damages level.
Sometimes even if they suffer a loss in a specific round by exercising the option in that
round, they might still do so in order to gain some profit from the following subgame.
This is because the price and damages are increasing every round and because there is
some probability that the other party will exercise back his/her option in the next round,
meaning the loss in the current round might be offset in the following round. This is the
strategic overbidding that the sequential option game induces. Knowing this strategic
incentive, it will be convenient to first pin down the optimal threshold values in every
round; whenever the party’s value is beyond the threshold value, he/she will exercise the
option in that round. We denote k (j n ) as the threshold value of round i in an nth -order
sequential option remedy regime, for j = 1,2,..., n. The buyer seeks to design a sequence

42

Actually, playing the game is not as difficult as it may first look because the game is just a simple
message-exchange, which can be accomplished in a short time.
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of p and d to induce the parties’ optimal option-exercising behavior that will maximize
the joint expected surplus.
Observe that viewed though this framework, an RLR contract is a first-order
option, under which the seller will breach whenever his cost is beyond k1(1) . In such a
regime, the buyer will offer an optimal k1(1) to maximize the joint payoff, which is,

Jπ (1) = F (k1(1) )[ E (v) − E (c / c ≤ k1(1) )] = (1 − k1(1) )k1(1) / 2.
*

The optimal k1(1) = 1 / 2 , i.e., the buyer will set expected expectation damages. This will
*

lead to a joint surplus of Jπ (1) = 1 / 8 .
Next observe that a two-price OER is simply a second-order sequential option,
under which the seller will attempt to breach in the first round whenever his costs are
above k1( 2) , and the buyer will insist on performance in the second round if her valuation
is above k 2( 2) . The expected joint payoff is,

Jπ ( 2 ) = F (k1( 2) )[(1 / 2) − E (c / c ≤ k1( 2 ) )] + [1 − F (k1( 2) )][1 − G (k 2( 2 ) )][ E (v / v ≥ k 2( 2 ) ) − E (c / c ≥ k1( 2 ) )].
*

*

*

The optimal k1( 2 ) = 1 / 3, k 2( 2 ) = 2 / 3, Jπ ( 2 ) = 4 / 27.
In a third-order sequential option contract, there is an additional round after the
buyer insists on performance in which the seller will breach if his cost is beyond k 3(3) .
The joint expected payoff is,
Jπ (3) = F (k1( 3) )[(1 / 2) − E (c / c ≤ k 3(3) )]
+ [ F (k 3( 3) ) − F (k1( 3) )][1 − G (k 2( 3) )][ E (v / v ≥ k 2( 3) ) − E (c / k1( 3) < c < k 3( 3) )].
*

*

*

*

The optimal k1( 3) = 1 / 4, k 2( 3) = 1 / 2, k 3( 3) = 3 / 4, Jπ ( 3) = 5 / 32.

More generally, under an nth -order sequential option remedy regime the joint
expected payoff (if n is an even number) is,
Jπ ( n ) = k1( n ) [(1 / 2) − E (c / c ≤ k1( n ) )] + (k 3( n ) − k1( n ) )(1 − k 2( n ) )[ E (v / v ≥ k 2( n ) ) − E (c / k1( n ) < c < k 3( n ) )]
+ (k 5( n ) − k 3( n ) )(1 − k 4( n ) )[ E (v / v ≥ k 4( n ) ) − E (c / k 3( n ) < c < k 5( n ) )] + ...
+ (k n( n−1) − k n( n−)3 )(1 − k n( n−)2 )[ E (v / v ≥ k n( n−)2 ) − E (c / k n( n−)3 < c < k n( −n1) )]
+ (1 − k n( n−1) )(1 − k n( n ) )[ E (v / v ≥ k n( n ) ) − E (c / c > k n( n−1) )].
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The first-order conditions for k i( n ) give us the optimal threshold values,
*

k (j n ) = j /(n + 1),

for

j = 1,2,..., n;

(5.1)

Remarks. (a) The optimal threshold values are an equal-distance series. This is an artifact
of our assumption of uniform distributions.
(b) If n is an odd number, the expected joint payoff is,
Jπ ( n ) = k1( n ) [(1 / 2) − E (c / c ≤ k1( n ) )] + (k 3( n ) − k1( n ) )(1 − k 2( n ) )[ E (v / v ≥ k 2( n ) ) − E (c / k1( n ) < c < k 3( n ) )]
+ ... + (k n( n ) − k n( n−)2 )(1 − k n( n−1) )[ E (v / v ≥ k n( n−1) ) − E (c / k n( n−)2 < c < k n( n ) )];
and the optimal solution is the same as when n is an even number.
*

(c) The equilibrium joint payoff is Jπ ( n ) =

n(n + 2)
. It is obvious that when
6(n + 1) 2
1 v

*

lim n→∞ Jπ ( n ) = 1 / 6, which is the first-best joint payoff ( ∫ ∫ (v − c)dcdv = 1 / 6 ).
0 0

{ }{ }

We now turn to explore what contract ( p0( n ) , pi( n ) , d i( n ) ) i =1, 2,...,( n / 2 ) can induce the
optimal threshold values we calculated above. We solve this in a kind of reverse way by
asking what threshold values the parties will take given a contract. Given the prices and
damages, the seller will choose threshold values (k1( n ) , k 3( n ) ,..., k n( n−1) ) to maximize his
expected payoff, and the buyer will choose threshold values (k 2( n ) , k 4( n ) ,..., k n( n ) ) to
maximize her expected payoff.
By definition, at the margin of the threshold values43 the party should get the
same expected payoff by not exercising the option as the payoff he/she would receive by
exercising the option. Given prices and damages, the equilibrium conditions for optimal
threshold values are as follows (assuming that n is an even number):

43

What we mean here is that if parties’ valuations are above these values than parties will exercise their
options. Parties will not exercise their options if their valuations fall below these threshold values.
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p0( n ) − k1( n ) = k 2( n ) (−d1( n ) ) + (1 − k 2( n ) )( p1( n ) − k1( n ) ),

k1( n ) :

k 2( n ) : k1( n ) (k 2( n ) − p0( n ) ) + (1 − k1( n ) )d1( n ) = k1( n ) (k 2( n ) − p0( n ) ) + (k 3( n ) − k1( n ) )(k 2( n ) − p1( n ) ) + (1 − k 3( n ) )d 2( n ) ,
k 3( n ) : k 2( n ) (−d1( n ) ) + (1 − k 2( n ) )( p1( n ) − k 3( n ) ) = k 2( n ) (−d1( n ) ) + (k 4( n ) − k 2( n ) )(−d 2( n ) ) + (1 − k 4( n ) )( p 2( n ) − k 3( n ) ),
...,
k n( n−1) : (1 − k n( n−)2 )( p((nn /) 2 )−1 − k n( n−1) ) = (k n( n ) − k n( n−)2 )(−d n( n/ )2 ) + (1 − k n( n ) )( p n( n/ )2 − k n( n−1) ),
k n( n ) : (1 − k n( n−1) )d n( n/ )2 = (1 − k n( n−1) )(k n( n ) − p n( n/ )2 ).
In any of the above equations, the left side is the party’s expected payoff when
he/she does not exercise the option; the right side is the party’s expected payoff when
he/she exercises the option.
*

Substituting the optimal threshold values, k (j n ) = j /(n + 1)

( j = 1,2,..., n) , into

the above equations and solving them, we get the optimal prices and damages:
*

*

pi( n ) = 2i /[3(n + 1)] + p 0( n ) ; d i( n ) = (n + 2i ) /[3(n + 1)] − p 0( n ) ,

i = 1,2,..., n / 2.

(5.2)

As explained before, parties can allocate the surplus according to their relative
bargaining power through the initial price, p0( n ) . In our example, where the buyer has all
the bargaining power, the buyer will set p0( n ) such that the seller’s expected payoff is
zero. The seller’s expected payoff is:

πS

(n)

= k1( n ) [ p0( n ) − E (c / c ≤ k1( n ) )] + (k 3( n ) − k1( n ) )[k 2( n ) (−d1( n ) ) + (1 − k 2( n ) )( p1( n ) − E (c / k1( n ) < v < k 3( n ) ))]

+ (k 5( n ) − k 3( n ) )[k 4( n ) (−d 2( n ) ) + (1 − k 4( n ) )( p 2( n ) − E (c / k 3( n ) < v < k 5( n ) ))] + ...
+ (k n( n−1) − k n( n−)3 )[k n( n−)2 (−d ((nn/) 2 )−1 ) + (1 − k n( n−)2 )( p((nn )/ 2 )−1 − E (c / k n( n−)3 < c < k n( n−1) ))]
+ (1 − k n( n−1) )[k n( n ) (−d n( n/ )2 ) + (1 − k n( n ) )( p n( n/ )2 − E (c / c ≥ k n( n−1) ))].

Substituting the optimal threshold values, prices, and damages into the equation,
we have the reduced form of the seller’s equilibrium expected payoff,

πS

( n)*

= p0( n ) − (7n 3 + 18n 2 + 17n + 9) /[18(n + 1) 3 ],

therefore, under the assumption that the buyer has all bargaining power,
*

p0( n ) = (7n 3 + 18n 2 + 17n + 9) /[18(n + 1) 3 ].

(5.3)
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Therefore, the parties can sign a simple fixed-term sequential-option contract,
*

{ }{ }
*

*

( p0( n ) , pi( n ) , d i( n ) ) i =1, 2,...,( n / 2) , defined by (5.2) and (5.3), at Time 1, and it can approach

the first best when we have sufficient number of rounds.
Proposition 4 An nth -order sequential option contract approaches first best efficiency

when n goes to infinity.
Figure 6 illustrates how the higher-order sequential-option remedy enhances efficiency.
With n different threshold values which partition the valuation space, the inefficiency
areas are reduced to many small triangles along the 450 line. In the limit, with infinitely
many rounds of sequential options, the triangular inefficiency areas converge to points on
the 450 line, and the allocation attains first best.

c

Breach

k 5*
Performance

k 3*
k1*
450

0

k 2*

k 4*

v

Figure 6. Higher-Order Sequential-Option Remedies

Remark: (a) It is well known that asymmetric information obstructs efficient trade, as was
famously shown in the “impossibility theorem” by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
The “impossibility theorem” exists because of the difficulty in satisfying the ex post IR
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constraints. As there is a continuum of types, there is a continuum of IR constraints to be
satisfied. Our contract in contrast approaches first best because the parties contract ex
ante, and thus the continuum of IR constraints is reduced to a single ex ante IR constraint
in expected terms. Indeed, as was shown by D’ Aspremont, Gerard-Varet (1979),
Konakayama, Mitsui and Watanabe (1986), and Rogerson (1992), an ex ante contract can
attain first best. (Observe though that their contracts are all contingent-contracts, which
are not usually seen in the real world.)
(b) Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Chung (1991), among others, demonstrated
that a simple contract plus a renegotiation design can replicate a complex mechanism in
inducing efficient trade and efficient investment. Their models, however, like others such
as Hart and Moore (1988), assume that the information is observable, but not verifiable.
In our model, in contrast, information is not observable. Yet, we were able to show that
we can asymptotically approach first-best.
(c) Exactly how large n should be is a matter of taste. For instance, in our uniform
distributions example, a four-round contract increases the joint surplus from 1/8 (which
was achieved in a single-round contract; also known as an RLR contract) to 4/25. This is
an increase of the joint surplus from 75% of the first-best to 96% of the first-best, in just
few rounds.
(d) Observe, that this simple fixed-term n-round contract essentially mimics the
bargaining process, trying to force the parties to reveal some information, and thereby
createing a finer partition of the parties’ information space. We know, however, that
under asymmetric information bargaining often leads to multiple equilibria and
inefficiencies. But our n-round contract is different from bargaining in several ways.
Bargaining is unstructured, but our contract is structured ex ante. By stipulating in the
contract, the parties have their option-exercising rights at their respective rounds. A party
does not need to get an agreement from the other party before exercising his option,
which is different from the consensual nature of bargaining.
(e) Through the option-exercising behavior, the private information is revealed gradually.
It works like an ascending auction, where the parties submit bids (prices and damages in
our case) for the right of performance. But unlike a typical auction, here the revenue will
not go to some third party; it will go to the losing bidder.
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(f) Our result can be applied to general distributions. Assuming c ~ F (c) on [c, c] ,

v ~ G (v) on [v, v] , where F and G are independent and common knowledge. Then, as

{ }

before, we first obtain the optimal threshold values k i( n )

*

i =1, 2 ,..., n

by maximizing the joint

surplus,
Jπ ( n ) = F (k1( n ) )[ E (v) − E (c / c ≤ k1( n ) )]
+ ( F (k 3( n ) ) − F ( k1( n ) ))(1 − G (k 2( n ) ))[ E (v / v ≥ k 2( n ) ) − E (c / k1( n ) < c < k 3( n ) )]
+ ... + ( F (k n( −n1) ) − F (k n( −n )3 ))(1 − G (k n( −n )2 ))[ E (v / v ≥ k n( n−)2 ) − E (c / k n( −n )3 < c < k n( −n1) )]
+ (1 − F (k n( −n1) ))(1 − G (k n( n ) ))[ E (v / v ≥ k n( n ) ) − E (c / c > k n( −n1) )].

In any given round whenever a party’s valuation is above the threshold value,
he/she will exercise the option at that round; otherwise the party will not exercise the
option.
Then to obtain the optimal prices and damages, we need to assume that prices and
damages are given and that parties maximize their individual payoffs by choosing
optimal threshold values. These marginal conditions will give us a group of equations
linking the threshold values and prices/damages; then by substituting the optimal
threshold values in, we can get the optimal prices and damages.

5.2 Continuous Case and Implementation
For general distribution we can show that more rounds are better than fewer
rounds, because with more rounds more information will be revealed through the option
exercising decisions. Thus, the allocative inefficiencies can be reduced.

Though the n-round sequential option remedy effectively allows the contract to
approach first-best, some may claim that the process is too cumbersome, although we
will argue that in fact it is actually a simple message-exchange game. Interestingly, we
have recently found that Knysh, Goldbart and Ayres (2004) extended the idea of higherorder liability rules (a legal regime which they apply to a stylized nuisance dispute) to the
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continuous type case. Extending work done by Ayres and Goldbart (2001) and Avraham
(2004) KGA observed that there is no need for many intermediate steps for their liability
regime to work.44 In a continuous setting, all n rounds can be reduced to a one-shot
auction, where the parties submitted their maximum bids (bS , bB ) for the entitlement, and
the court will allocate the entitlement to the highest bidder, asking him to pay the loser
damages, which are functions of the submitted bids ( p (bB ), d (bS ) ). They show that for
general distributions with arbitrary correlations, a class of mechanisms, ( A, p(bB ), d (bS )) ,
with A being a constant which can be used for distributing the surplus between the
parties can achieve first-best. They further show that such a mechanism is incentive
compatible, i.e., the parties will submit their true valuations.
KGA’s result is easily implemented and robust to correlated valuations.45 As
KGA admit, their result is not a challenge to Myerson and Satterthaite (1983), because
they ignore the IR constraint in their analysis by assuming that the parties are already in
the game. Under this assumption, KGA’s mechanism achieves first-best. While KGA's
work was applied to non-contractual relationships between a polluter and a pollutee, It is
straight forward to extend KGA’s mechanism to our ex ante contracting environment.
One can use KGA’s mechanism to implement an n-round sequential option contract in a
one-shot auction, in which it can attain first-best efficiency. It is also incentive
compatible and individually rational. The key is that while their parameter A is not
sufficient to satisfy a continuum of ex post IR constraints, it is sufficient to satisfy a
single ex ante IR constraint.
Proposition 5 Through an instantaneous liability rule auction, we can achieve first-best

with IR, IC satisfied.

44

In Ayres and Goldbart (2001) and Avraham (2004) courts determine ex-post the magnitude of damages,
whereas here the parties do that ex-ante via the liquidated damages clause. More importantly, Ayres and
Goldbart (2001) and Avraham (2004) consider a nuisance dispute where parties are already in a
relationship, and therefore there is no need to consider the ex-ante incentives to participate (the IR
constraint). Here, in contrast, we explore possible remedies in case of a contact dispute and not a nuisance
dispute and therefore we do emphasize the IR constraint at the ex-ante stage.
45
Hermalin and Katz (1993)’s “fill-in-the-price” mechanism, for example, doesn’t work for imperfectly
correlated distributions
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Proof: The parties sign a KGA contract ( A, p(bB ), d (bS )) ex ante in which each party will
submit a bid, b , to the court after he/she learned his/her valuations. Then by KGA, it
will be incentive compatible and first-best efficient.
We denote a buyer of type v ’s ex post payoff (excluding the constant A from the
KGA contract) as π B (v) ; similarly, we denote a seller of type c ’s ex post payoff
(excluding the constant A from the KGA contract) as π S (c) . Then by choosing A such
c

that A + ∫ π S (c)dF (c) = 0 we can make the contract satisfy IR constraints, because ex
c

post the buyer will receive a payoff of π B (v) − A , while the seller will receive a payoff of

π S (c) + A . It satisfies ex post collective IR, which is

∑π = π

B

(v) + π S (c) ≥ 0;

The buyer’s ex ante payoff is
v

∫π
v

v

B

c

v c

(v)dG (v) − A = ∫ π (v)dG (v) + ∫ π (c)dF (c) = ∫ ∫ ∑ π dG (v)dF (c) ≥ 0.
B

v

S

c

QED.

v c

Remark: D’ Aspremont, and Gerard-Varet (1979), Konokayama, Mitsui and Watanabe
(1986), and Rogerson (1992) also can implement the continuous solution for uncorrelated
distributions. KGA, however, showed that the first best can be achieved for very general
correlated distributions with an infinite number of rounds. Actually, at the interim stage
with parties having asymmetric information before bargaining as in Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), McAfee and Reny (1992) have shown that even a very small
correlation between the parties’ values can eliminate the informational rent, and thus
restore the first-best efficiency.
6. Summary and Future Research.
In this paper we showed that with two-sided uncertainty parties can still do better
themselves through careful contract-design than was previously thought. There is an
intrinsic tension between, on the one hand, letting parties determine their remedies at the
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time they enter the contract and, on the other hand, letting the court make use of the
information that has been revealed by the time of the breach. Our approach tries to take
advantage of the good in both sides. We suggest allowing the parties to postpone
choosing a remedy until they have already learned the new information. In this way we
keep the choice of remedy in the parties’ hands, and we allow them to take advantage of
the new information revealed to them at them time of the breach.
A regime which allows the parties to agree, if they wish, to give the buyer the
option to enforce the contract (or get actual damages) is superior to both a legal regime of
specific performance as well as to the current damage regime which restricts this option.
From a doctrinal perspective, our analysis indicates that courts should enforce parties’
contracts, whether the liquidated damages clause is exclusive or optional to other
remedies such as specific performance or damages. Thus, to the extent that the current
law restricts such options, it should be modified. Moreover, we believe that the proposed
contract clauses will likely be enforced by courts, especially if the new proposed changes
in the UCC will be accepted. The new UCC is more liberal in enforcing liquidated
damages clauses and specific performance clauses than the current UCC. We thus
estimate the under the new UCC courts will be more likely to respect a clause which
allows the aggrieved party to choose upon breach whether she prefers the liquidated
damages or performance.
The OER regime, while improving upon the current regime, does not achieve first
best, but on average it achieves only about 90% of it. We thus extended our model to a
contract that includes a higher-order sequential option, which we showed can approach
first best even in the environment of double-sided asymmetric information. Our extension
resonates with the result that a simple contract with renegotiation can replace a more
complex contingent contract, as shown in Chung (1991), and Aghion, Dewatripont and
Rey (1994). In their models, the valuations are observable (though not verifiable), so
efficient renegotiation is feasible. In our model, the information is kept private even after
the resolution of uncertainties, erecting an insurmountable hurdle to efficient bargaining.
With the strong information-revealing property of the sequential option contract,
however, first best still can be approached with a simple fixed-term contract.
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In his new book on the economic analysis of contracts, Steve Shavell argues that
when courts are not able to determine the value of performance, parties will often want to
write a liquidated damages clause when seller's cost are uncertain. Shavell then mentions
that this would not be a possibility for the parties when there is two-sided uncertainty so
that the value of performance to the buyer is also uncertain. As an example Shavell says
that “if the value of having a factory constructed on time will vary, due to market
conditions for the product the buyer is going to produce in the factory, then the parties
cannot specify the damages to be paid in advance.”46 In this paper we demonstrate that
parties do have simple ways to mitigate this problem. We proposed a contract-clause
which does that and argued that it is sometimes superior to the conventional alternatives.
The new clause takes advantage of the information that the seller and the buyer receive
between the time they entered the contract and the time of the breach.
There are several issues that we leave for future research. First, our model can be
extended to analyze different information structures. Second, our model can be extended
to account for renegotiation between the seller and the buyer. Third, one can study
optimal investment decisions, given our, or any other, information structure. Following
Che and Hausch (1999), we believe that both self-investments and cooperativeinvestments are worth exploring. Fourth, it will be interesting to follow-up on the
literature which accounts for third-party entrants. On this point, it is interesting to note
that Chung (1992), for example, analyzed a case where the third-party’s offer is
observable to the original buyer and seller, but is not verifiable by the courts. He showed
that if the potential entrant, the third party, has some bargaining power, first best cannot
be obtained. Chung assumed no renegotiation in his model and restricted his attention to
one-sided uncertainty. Spier & Whinston (1995) studied an environment where the
buyer’s value, the seller’s cost and the entrant’s offer are observable to all parties; the
only uncertainty arises from the entrant’s offer. In that information structure one can
safely assume, as Spier and Whinston did, that efficient renegotiation is feasible.
Efficient renegotiation is certainly more difficult to attain when all parties have private
information, as in our model. Lastly, Hua 2003 studied an ex-ante contract between a

46

Discussion Paper No. 403, 02/2003. Footnote 77 and the text around it.
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buyer and a seller which essentially provides the buyer some strategic advantage against
a potential new buyer who later arrives. Hua showed that the original buyer and seller can
jointly extract rent from the new buyer, but that it can nevertheless be more socially
efficient than the absence of such contract because it mitigates the seller’s ex-post rent
seeking vis-à-vis the original buyer. Hua’s model, however, assumes one sideduncertainty and no renegotiation or investments.
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7. Appendix.
7.1 General
The appendix collects the proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 and some numerical
comparative statics.
A buyer (B) and a seller (S) are trading an indivisible good. The seller’s cost c is random
over the interval [c, c] , with distribution F (c) . The buyer’s value ( v ) is distributed
according to G (v) over the interval [v, v] . F(.) and G(.) are common knowledge.
E (v) ≥ E (c) (There are trading opportunities ex ante).
We focus our attention on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of expected future
new information and, therefore, assume no renegotiation or investments are involved. We
study a model where the seller is only party who can breach.
The following is a standard Monotone Hazard Rate assumption we will use in our
analysis:
Assumption A1

1 − F ( x)
g ( x)
and
are decreasing in x .
f ( x)
G ( x)

Subscripts O (R) denote values under OER (RLR) in the liquidated damages model.

7.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3

If g ( E (v ))[1 − F ( E (v ))][ E (c / c ≥ E (v )) − E (v )] < f ( E (v ))G ( E (v ))[ E (v ) − E (v / v ≤ E (v))],
then k O* < E (v).
Proof: The first order condition, (2.3), can be rewritten as:
kO*

Γ( k ) = − f (k )G (k )(k −
*
O

*
O

*
O

*
O

∫ vdG(v)
v

c

∫ cdF (c)

kO*

− k O* ]
) + g (k )[1 − F (k )][
*
1 − F (k O )
G (k )
*
O

*
O

*
O

= g (k O* )[1 − F (k O* )][ E (c / c ≥ k O* ) − k O* ] − f (k O* )G (k O* )[(k O* ) − E (v / v ≤ k O* )] = 0

If g ( E (v ))[1 − F ( E (v ))][ E (c / c ≥ E (v )) − E (v )] < f ( E (v ))G ( E (v ))[ E (v ) − E (v / v ≤ E (v))],
then Γ ( E (v )) < 0 . The second-order condition implies that Γ′ < 0 , hence we have
k O* < E (v ).

QED.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 1 and 2 imply that:
*

*

c

v

E (v)

kO*

kO*

c

π OB − π RB = F (k O* ) E (v) − E (c) + G (k O* ) ∫ cdF (c) + [1 − F (k O* )] ∫ vdG (v) − F ( E (v)) E (v) +
= [ F (k ) − F ( E (v))]E (v) −

v

c

c

*
O

∫ cdF (c) + G(k ) ∫ cdF (c) + [1 −F (k )] ∫ vdG(v)
*
O

*
O

kO*

E (v)

∫ cdF (c)

(7.1)

kO*

Proposition 1 In a regime of double-sided uncertainty where parties specific

performance and liquidated damages clauses are honored, OER is Pareto superior to
RLR, if E (v / v ≥ E (v )) > E (c / c ≥ E (v )) .
Proof: Let k O = E (v), pO = x , then the seller’s expected payoff is:

π OS

kO = E ( v ), pO = x

= [1 − G ( E (v)) + F ( E (v))G ( E (v))]x
c

− [1 − F ( E (v))]G ( E (v))[ E (v) − x] − E (c) + G ( E (v)) ∫ cdF (c)
E (v)

c

= x − E (c) + G ( E (v)) ∫ cdF (c) − [1 − F ( E (v))]G ( E (v)) E (v)
E (v)

c

Let π OS = 0 , we have p O = E (c) − G ( E (v)) ∫ cdF (c) + [1 − F ( E (v))]G ( E (v)) E (v) . Since
E (v)

this price plus d O = E (V ) − pO guarantees the seller’s expected payoff is zero, it is a
feasible contract. Plugging this specific contract into the buyer’s payoff function and
simplifying, we get

π OB

c

pO = E ( c ) −G ( E ( v )) ∫ cdF ( c ) +[1− F ( E ( v ))]G ( E ( v )) E ( v ), d O = E ( v ) − pO
E (v)

v

c

E (v)

E (v)

= F ( E (v)) E (v) + [1 − F ( E (v))] ∫ vdG (v) − E (c) + G ( E (v)) ∫ cdF (c)

and we have
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π OB

c

pO = E ( c ) −G ( E ( v )) ∫ cdF ( c ) +[1− F ( E ( v ))]G ( E ( v )) E ( v ), d O = E ( v ) − pO

− π RB

*

E (v)

v

c

E (v)

E (v)

= F ( E (v)) E (v) + [1 − F ( E (v))] ∫ vdG (v) − E (c) + G ( E (v)) ∫ cdF (c)
E (v)

∫ cdF (c)

− F ( E (v)) E (v) +

c

v

c

E (v)

E (v)

= [1 − F ( E (v))] ∫ vdG (v) − [1 − G ( E (v))] ∫ cdF (c)
= [1 − F ( E (v))][1 − G ( E (v))][ E (v / v ≥ E (v)) − E (c / c ≥ E (v))] > 0
By the optimality of p O* and d O* , we have
*

π OB = π OB

pO* , d O*

≥ π OB

c

pO = E ( c ) −G ( E ( v )) ∫ cdF ( c ) +[1− F ( E ( v ))]G ( E ( v )) E ( v ), d O = E ( v ) − pO

, therefore,

E (v)

*

*

π OB − π RB ≥ π OB

*

c

pO = E ( c ) −G ( E ( v )) ∫ cdF ( c ) +[1− F ( E ( v ))]G ( E ( v )) E ( v ), d O = E ( v ) − pO

− π RB > 0 if

E (v)

E (v / v ≥ E (v )) > E (c / c ≥ E (v )) .

QED.

7.4 Comparative Statistics
7.4.1 A comparison of the price and damages under the two contracts.
Our numerical model enables us to take a closer look at the specific price and
damage clauses that the parties will agree on. Consider first the different prices that OER
and RLR contracts will have. A buyer’s subsequent option to enforce makes the seller
worse off under the same price and damage term because he loses the power to
unilaterally breach. Thus, one would expect that the buyer will “compensate” the seller
for the switch from an RLR contract to an OER contract, either by offering a higher price
or by allowing the seller to pay lower damages in case of a breach, or any combination
the two. Indeed, our numerical example confirms this intuition. The buyer will “bribe”
the seller to switch from the RLR to OER contract, with either a higher price, lower
damages, or both. Graphs 2a and 2b present the results.
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Graph 2b- A Comparison of the Contract Damages.
Graph 2a shows that in general the OER contract price is higher, except for a very
small area where the seller’s sigma is extremely small and his mean is relatively large.
Graph 2b shows that, in general, the damages in the OER contract are smaller, except for
a very small area where both seller’s sigma and mean are very large.47 Thus, for every
possible iteration of the seller’s costs and the buyer’s valuation, the OER contract
provides the seller with either a higher price, or lower damages, or both.

7.4.2 The case of negative damages.
An interesting result of our research is that sometimes parties will agree on
negative damages under the single price OER contract. Graph 3 presents it.
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Graph 3- The Stipulated Damages in an OER contract.
47

The reader should recall the Seller’s maximum mean is equal to the buyer’s mean.
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As graph 3 shows, when the seller’s sigma is relatively small, the stipulated
damages that the seller will have to pay in case of a contract breach are negative. That is,
in these circumstances, when the seller considers to breach the contract, the buyer might
well agree to pay to the seller the predetermined stipulated amount in order to prevent the
seller from performing and secure a breach.48
To understand the intuition for this result we first have to observe two facts. First,
for low sigmas the seller’s optimal breach threshold, k O* , is always smaller than the
seller’s mean. That is, for low sigmas we observe that:
k O* < E[c]
Graph 4 presents this result.
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Graph 4- The Stipulated Damages in an OER contract minus E[c].

48

Compare to Ayres and $$, threats for in efficient performance.
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As Graph 4 shows, for a low seller’s sigma the breach threshold, k O* , minus the
seller’s mean, E[c], is negative. This fact indicates that from the ex-ante perspective the
seller’s ex-post costs are most likely to exceed in these cases the breach threshold, k O* .49
This means that more likely than not, a seller with a low sigma will attempt to breach
because his costs are higher than the breach threshold.
However, the buyer’s mean, for most parts, is larger than the seller’s mean. Thus,
from the ex-ante perspective the buyer’s ex-post valuation is, too, most likely to exceed
the breach threshold. This means that the buyer will most likely insist on performance in
these cases.
To summarize, under the OER contract in cases of a seller with a low sigma, the
seller will most likely want to breach, and the buyer will most likely insist on
performance.
The second fact to observe is that the price the buyer offers in the OER
contract, pO* , is also always smaller than the seller’s mean (no matter what the seller’s
sigma is).50 This fact indicates that the seller gets a price, pO* , which does not cover his
expected costs for a contract which he will most likely have to perform. A risk neutral
seller might of course not agree to such a contract in the first place. To make it
individually rational for the seller to agree to such a contract, the buyer must promise the
seller negative damages.
But under what circumstances would the buyer be willing to pay negative
damages? Sometimes the buyer’s ex-post valuation will be so low that she will prefer to
pay the seller not to perform. She will prefer this option on the alternative, which is to
pay the full price pO* for a good for which her valuation is so low. From the seller’s
perspective, the possibility for this rare expected profit in cases of a breach somewhat
makes up for the more likely expected loss from performance.

49

There is a 50% chance that seller's costs will be higher than his mean. Thus, there is more than 50%
*

chance that his costs will be higher than k O which is smaller than seller's mean (for low sigmas).
50

To see this, observe that if the contract restricted the remedy to always being specific performance, then
to keep the Seller’s expected payoff equal to zero, the buyer must have offered a price equal to the Seller’s
mean costs. Since in the OER contract there are some cases where the Seller can avoid performance, the
buyer can offer a lower price.
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